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ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
AND THE CONCEPT OF NON-NEGOTIABLE
FEE AWARDS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988
EMILY M. CALHOUN*
The adoption of 42 U.S.C. § 1988,1 which gives courts discre-
tion to allow attorney's fees to a prevailing party in civil rights litiga-
tion 2 has created troublesome ethical dilemmas for plaintiffs' attor-
neys. Section 1988 gives attorneys a fee interest in the litigation, and
that fee interest is frequently at odds with the attorney's obligation
to protect the plaintiff's interests during settlement negotiations.
Courts and attorneys have attempted through various devices to
avoid or minimize the conflict of interest inherent in settlement nego-
tiations of civil rights claims. Their success, however, has been lim-
ited. Proposed solutions either cannot reduce the conflict to a tolera-
ble level or create more problems for the judiciary than they solve.
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Lisa Hamilton-Fieldman for her inval-
uable legal research and editorial assistance.
1. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 reads in part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985 and 1986 or this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et
seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.], the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
2. Section 1988 mentions by name only civil rights actions brought under the Recon-
struction Era civil rights statutes, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. Although only a limited number of statutory causes of action
are mentioned by name as predicates for § 1988 fee awards, § 1988 is potentially applicable to
many other civil rights claims as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). In that case, the Court held that federal statutory claims en-
forced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would support a § 1988 fee award. See also Maher v. Gagne,
448 U.S. 122 (1980). Compare Smith v. Robinson, 52 U.S.L.W. 5179 (S. Ct. July 5, 1984).
342 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
The most satisfactory method of minimizing the conflict be-
tween the attorney's fee interest and the plaintiff's interest in the
merits of a lawsuit is to make section 1988 attorney's fees non-nego-
tiable during settlement. Courts and attorneys have not directly ex-
perimented with the concept of fee non-negotiability when section
1988 claims are made, but they have adopted measures which are
intended indirectly to achieve some of the effects of non-negotiabil-
ity. Those measures, however, consume unnecessary amounts of judi-
cial time and resources as a by-product.
This article explores the concept of fee non-negotiability as a
solution to the ethical dilemma facing a plaintiff's attorney during
settlement negotiations of a case in which a section 1988 fee award
is available. The first section of the article briefly discusses the objec-
tives and impacts of section 1988, and the second section describes
the nature of the conflict of interest which exists in settlement nego-
tiations. Both sections provide a foundation for the third section,
which discusses the devices to which courts and attorneys have re-
sorted for resolution of the problem, and for the fourth section,
which argues that fee awards be considered non-negotiable items
during settlement discussions. Although the concept of non-negotia-
bility runs counter to the philosophy that litigants should be en-
couraged and given the opportunity to settle controversies which oth-
erwise will demand judicial resolution,' it should nonetheless govern
section 1988 fee claims. Whatever additional judicial resources are
consumed in resolving non-negotiable fee claims will more than be
offset by the fact that courts will no longer have to expend their
energies resolving the many issues which arise during settlement ne-
gotiations because of the attorney's fee interest. Moreover, non-nego-
tiability has the added, important advantage of ensuring that con-
gressional objectives which prompted the adoption of section 1988
will be fulfilled.
3. The Supreme Court recently reminded parties to civil rights litigation that they
"should make a conscientious effort, when a fee award is to be made, to resolve any differ-
ences" and reminded courts that they have "a responsibility to encourage agreement." Blum v.
Stenson, 52 U.S.L.W. 4377, 4381 n.19 (U.S. S. Ct. March 21, 1984). Other courts also view
the goal of settlement as so important that it ought not to be compromised by solutions to the
conflict of interest problem discussed in this article. See, e.g., Godwin v. Schramm, Nos. 83-
5065, 83-5129, 83-5130, slip op. (3d Cir., March 30, 1984) (available April 15, 1984, on




I. THE OBJECTIVES AND IMPACTS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1988
The copious legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988' reveals that
Congress authorized fee awards in lawsuits prosecuted under the Re-
construction Era civil rights statutes, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, in
order to encourage enforcement of the rights guaranteed by those
statutes.5 Congress believed that, in the absence of an attorney's fee
provision, attorneys might not offer their services to litigate civil
rights claims because of the indigency of aggrieved parties,' because
civil rights cases frequently result in non-monetary relief from which
no contingency fee could be expected, or because of the unpopular
nature of the claim.e Congress also believed that an attorney's fee
provision might induce voluntary compliance with federal law and
serve as a deterrent to illegal conduct.9
Because of section 1988, civil rights litigation is usually con-
ducted with the expectation of an attorney's fee award. Attorneys
4. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5908-14; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); SUBCOMM. ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS ACT OF 1976 SOURCE BOOK (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter,
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. See also The Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representa-
tion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT
AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (1981), for a discussion of the history behind the adoption of §
1988.
5. See the sources cited in note 4, supra, and in particular SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 4, 6, 8-12, 19-20, 199-200, 209-11. The concept of private attorneys general
- private citizens filing court actions to vindicate their civil rights and those of the public as a
whole - pervades much of the legislative history of the Act. See also Hensley v. Eckerhart,
103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983), holding that "[t]he purpose of § 1988 is to ensure 'effec-
tive access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances." (Citations omitted.)
6. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, 8, 19, 209.
7. Id. at 3, 200, 217.
8. Congress cited with approval the opinion in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). In that case, the "undesirability" of the case was identified
as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of a fee award. Id. at 719. See SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
9. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, 200. In addition to specific refer-
ences to this aspect of the attorney's fee statute, deterrence of civil rights violations is implicit
in the broader purpose of encouraging actions by private attorneys general. See also Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933, 1944 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1501 (10th Cir. 1983); Oldham v. Ehr-
lich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980); and Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980),
cited with approval in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 n.31
(1982), for the proposition that § 1988 was intended to encourage voluntary compliance with
civil rights laws.
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frequently request courts to award fees in civil rights cases' ° and, as
a result, litigation over the propriety of fee awards proliferates. Since
the enactment of section 1988 in 1976, approximately 1730 federal
court decisions have interpreted the statute." Notwithstanding Jus-
tice Powell's optimistic wish that the fee issue not generate its own
corpus of judicial opinion,'5 the proliferation of litigation is under-
standable because the amount of any given fee award may be quite
large.'3
In contrast, prior to the adoption of section 1988, civil rights
litigation was handled by attorneys largely on a pro bono basis. Al-
though courts were frequently requested to make equitable fee
awards, especially in the late sixties and early seventies,' no one
assumed that recovery was guaranteed or even routinely to be ex-
pected in civil rights cases.1 Traditionally, courts had been reluctant
to award fees absent evidence of bad faith litigation or, perhaps, the
presence of a common fund from which to draw the award. In 1974,
the Supreme Court adopted these factors as limitations on the inher-
ent equitable authority of federal courts to award fees.' 6 Even when
10. See E. LARSON, supra note 4, at 1-3. By generously defining who qualifies as a
"prevailing party" under §1988, and providing that, while fees are in the courts' discretion,
they should rarely be denied to a prevailing plaintiff, the legislators who adopted § 1988 must
have anticipated routine application for fees. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11,
215.
11. This figure, determined as of June 4, 1984, includes ten cases in which the Supreme
Court of the United States has ruled on the attorney's fee issue.
12. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th
Cir. 1983) (award of $455,738, reduced from district court award of $521,163); White v. City
of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1983) (district court's award of $694,186, including
multiplier of 1.5 used to adjust fee according to "degree of success", affirmed); Lamphere v.
Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1979) (award of $272,600 not excessive).
14. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 248-49
(1975), for a comprehensive list of relevant cases, see The Effect of Legal Fees on the Ade-
quacy of Representation: Hearings Before the Sumcomm. on Representation of Citizen Inter-
ests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); and the history set
forth in Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: "What Is Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
281 (1977); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 636 (1974) (discussing the private attorney general concept used as the basis
for awarding fees subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Newman v. Piggie Park En-
terprises, Inc. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
15. The fact that fee recovery was not assured was a cornerstone of the Supreme Court's
analysis in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 429-31 (1978). See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966), for an early plea for
adoption of fee-shifting rules in litigation generally, and Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in
Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD. L. REV. 379 (1973), who argued that a
fee-shifting statute ought to be available for civil rights litigants.
16. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Thus, between
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courts were able to award fees, the amount of the award was un-
likely to fully compensate the attorney for time expended in litiga-
tion.1 7 In other words, fee awards did not become truly significant in
civil rights litigation until the adoption of section 1988.18
Since most attorney services in civil rights litigation were pro
bono in nature, those services did not implicate many of the profes-
sional canons of ethics and disciplinary rules which constrain the
conduct of private practitioners who offer their services for a fee. In
some instances, most notably in NAACP v. Button" and In re
Primus,'o courts determined that the nonpecuniary motivation for
the services exempted an attorney from the usual disciplinary rules. 1
In other instances, disciplinary rules were inapplicable because, by
1975 and the effective date of §1988, judicial authority to award fees was quite limited.
17. Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975) (award is not to be based on
reasonable marketplace rate, but on Criminal Justice Act fee schedule, which sets rates at one-
third to one-half marketplace rate); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973) (attorneys' fees of $750 awarded in complex case involving dis-
charge in violation of first amendment right to free speech); Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp. 1037
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (award of $1,500 in class action concerning non-tenured teacher's right to
maternity leave which included appeal on the merits). But cf Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691
(N.D. Ala. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 409 U.S. 942 (1972) (total award,
including costs, clerks, and attorney's fees, of $28,083, in reapportionment case).
18. The congressional proponents of § 1988 insisted that fee awards had played a signifi-
cant role in civil rights litigation prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1974). See, e.g., SunCoMMIrEE REPORT, supra
note 4 at 3, 7, 12. The appendices to the legislative history, which list only a relatively small
number of cases involving fee requests, belie the proponents' assertions, as does the discussion
of the history of judicial awards of attorney's fees contained in the Alyeska opinion. See supra
notes 14 and 17. It cannot be denied, however, that courts became increasingly willing to
entertain requests for fees and believed that they had the authority to do so subsequent to
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
19. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
20. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
21. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), "staff" attorneys were sometimes com-
pensated by the NAACP at a per diem rate of $60.00, but the Supreme Court stated that this
rate was well below what the attorneys could have expected to receive had they devoted their
skill to conventional private litigation. Id. at 420-21. The Court characterized the litigation
activity of the attorneys and the NAACP as a form of political expression and association. Id.
at 429-31. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), evaluated the conduct of an attorney who had
solicited a client for the ACLU, an organization which had asked for an attorney's fee award.
The Court differentiated between litigation activities motivated primarily by the goal of vindi-
cating civil liberties and those motivated primarily by pecuniary gain. Id. at 429-31. The for-
mer were considered by the Court to be constitutionally protected as long as they did not "in
fact [involve] the type of misconduct at which [the state's] . . . broad prohibition is said to be
directed." Id. at 434 (emphasis added). See also Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 472-
73 (5th Cir. 1980), and Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D.
Ky. 1981), which rely on the political/pecuniary distinction.
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definition, they applied to financial agreements2 which are non-exis-
tent in a pro bono case.
Section 1988 alters the position of civil rights attorneys vis a vis
canons of professional ethics and disciplinary rules. It gives attorneys
a pecuniary interest in the outcome of litigation that is neither spec-
ulative"3 nor insubstantial.2 The conflict of interest arising out of
section 1988 poses an ethical dilemma which attorneys cannot
ignore.25
II. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST DURING SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS
The nature of the conflict of interest which arises during settlement
negotiations has recently been the subject of some judicial discussion
and scholarly comment." The conflict can best be discussed with ref-
erence to an uncomplicated case, in which a named client does not
22. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106, DR 2-107
(1979).
23. Under § 1988, fees are ordinarily to be awarded to prevailing parties in the absence
of special circumstances which would render the award unjust. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 U.S.
S. Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983) (citing S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908).
24. See supra note 13.
25. It cannot be assumed that the Constitution of the United States will protect attor-
neys from the normal application of disciplinary rules. Civil rights attorneys have previously
been protected from traditional applications of disciplinary rules by the first amendment, as
long as their motivation for providing representation could be characterized as political rather
than pecuniary. See supra note 21. The distinction between political and pecuniary motives is
a difficult one to make, as Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Primus, 436 U.S. 440, 441-
43 (1978). See also the Supreme Court's decision in Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia,
377 U.S. 1 (1967). The routine availability of fee awards under § 1988 may alter the Supreme
Court's analysis of the constitutional protection afforded civil rights attorneys accused of vio-
lating canons of professional ethics, because the motives of the attorneys may now be pecuni-
ary in nature. In Primus, for example, the Court rested its decision on the fact that pre-§ 1988
fee awards were available only in limited circumstances, were not guaranteed, and would be
lower than the fee that could be obtained in private litigation. 436 U.S. at 429-31. Section
1988 makes fee awards generally available and those awards may well be substantial. See
supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. In Primus, the Court reserved judgment as to what
its decision would have been "where the income of the lawyer who solicits the prospective
litigant or who engages in the actual representation of the solicited client rises or falls with the
outcome of the particular litigation." 436 U.S. at 436 n.30.
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis withstands modification be-
cause of the adoption of § 1988, attorneys will not be shielded from sanctions imposed for
conduct which is in fact unethical because they have subordinated the client's interests to their
own interest in a fee award. See supra note 21.
26. Levin, Practical, Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the Settlement of
Cases in Which Statutory Fees Are Authorized, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 515 (1980); Stein
and Fisher, The Proportionality Test in Section 1988 Fee Awards, 14 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4
n.21 (1982).
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represent a class 27 and in which the client's attorney is not affiliated
with a public interest organization." These factors complicate and
exacerbate a conflict which is inherent in any litigation which in-
volves a statutory fee award. For purposes of clarity, therefore, the
more uncomplicated attorney-client relationship will be used as the
focus for this discussion. In addition, although a defendant may re-
ceive an award of fees under section 1988, the discussion assumes
that the party requesting fees is the plaintiff."
In a certain sense, the conflict of interest existing between attor-
ney and client when a statutory fee award is at stake is similar to the
conflict of interest inherent in any contingent fee agreement.30 Both
27. A class action creates a litigation environment in which it is tempting for an attor-
ney to ignore the potentially more remote interests of the class clients in favor of his and the
named plaintiffs' more immediate interests. See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual
and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CAUF. L. REV. 1656 (1972).
28. Attorney affiliation with a public interest organization may increase the pressure on
attorneys to pay more attention to the interests of the organization than to those of their
clients. The pressure may be especially strong if the organization itself expects to benefit from
an award of attorney's fees. Fee awards are frequently expected to go to a public interest
organization, as in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). Usually, however, the pressure is due
simply to the intensity of the organization's interest in legal principles at risk in the litigation.
That interest may override a concern for the client's interest in more tangible relief. The kind
of influence which a public interest organization may exert over litigation is discussed in In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
29. The ethical difficulties confronting counsel for a defendant seeking a settlement in-
volving attorney's fees would not necessarily differ from those which confront a plaintiff's at-
torney. Requests made by defendants are, however, rare. The statutory prerequisite for an
award of fees to a defendant differs from that for an award of fees to a plaintiff. The latter
must only prevail; the former must establish that the litigation was frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16 (1980). That difference should affect,
of course, the attorney's assessment of the risks of litigating the fee issue. Only one of the
judicial decisions which discusses the ethical dilemmas associated with settlement of a statu-
tory fee award involved a defendant's request for fees. See Obin v. Dist. No. 9 of the Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981).
30. A report of the American Bar Foundation, F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEEs pOR
LEGAL SERVICES (1964), classifies statutory fee awards as contingent fees. Id. at 24 & 62.
Contingent fee agreements have historically been viewed with some suspicion. It is feared that
they create conflicts of interest between the attorney and client, that they may lead to "over-
reaching" practices by attorneys, or that they may foster or stir up litigation. Id. at 39-44.
Although contingent fee awards which are based on a statute like § 1988 rather than on a
contract generate some of the same fears, the American Bar Foundation Report does not ex-
plore the unique differences in the ethical difficulties associated with statutory contingent fees.
The differences can be significant. The American Bar Foundation Report notes, for example,
that the validity of contractual contingent fee agreements has depended, to a certain extent, on
the type of litigation they may encourage. Id. at Ch. 4. Traditional ethical rules attempting to
minimize the possibility that litigation will be fostered will have a much different, and presum-
ably minimal, significance when a statute like § 1988 is adopted precisely because it will en-
courage litigation which might otherwise not be pursued. The American Bar Foundation Re-
port does not discuss the relationship between statutory purpose and ethical constraints on
348 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
section 1988 and the contingent fee agreement give an attorney a
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation. If the litigation is
unsuccessful, the attorney does not receive a fee. 81 If the client wins
a damage award under the contingent fee contract or prevails as re-
quired by section 1988, a1 the attorney is compensated for services.
Unlike the contractual contingent fee, however, the statutory fee
award comes from the defendant and not out of the plaintiff's recov-
ery. For that reason, the conflict between attorney and client gener-
ated by the statutory fee award may appear to be less troublesome
than the conflict inherent in contingent fee contracts which tie an
attorney's fee to a percentage of the plaintiff's recovery. The conflict
is in fact less troublesome, however, only when the plaintiff prevails
after a trial on the merits.
During settlement negotiations, the conflict generated by statu-
tory fee awards is just as severe as that arising from a contingent fee
contract. A few examples will illustrate the magnitude of the conflict
for the attorney who has an interest in the outcome of the litigation
because of a statutory fee provision like section 1988. Some of the
conflicts described might also arise if an attorney had a contingent
fee agreement, while others are unique to the attorney whose com-
pensation depends on a statutory fee provision.
In typical civil rights litigation, various forms of relief are
sought. Injunctive or declaratory relief, as well as damages, may be
requested. Under section 1988, a plaintiff may prevail through settle-
ment for purposes of an award of attorney's fees even if all of the
requested relief is not obtained." During settlement negotiations,
therefore, there is a danger that the defendant will attempt to "buy
off" the plaintiff's attorney. Both courts3 4 and litigants" recognize
attorney conduct. That relationship is critical to the proposal made in this article.
31. Unless otherwise specified, the contingent fee contracts to which reference is made
provide for no attorney compensation in the event litigation is unsuccessful. See, e.g., the sam-
ple contingent fee contract recommended by the Colorado Supreme Court. COLO. REV. STAT.,
Ch. 23.3, Court Rules (Supp. 1983).
32. See infra notes. 34-43 and 180-89, and accompanying texts for a discussion of how a
plaintiff may prevail.
33. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933 (1983); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122
(1980). In fact, a plaintiff may be a prevailing party even if the settlement agreement states
that the agreement "does not constitute an admission by any party as to any issue of fact or
law regarding discrimination by and/or liability of the [defendant). Ross v. Saltmarsh,
521 F. Supp. 753, 756 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
34. Among the decisions which have recognized the problem is Prandini v. National Tea
Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977). The court in Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1980) notes that the incentives to buy off plaintiffs counsel exist even in cases
in which no monetary relief is requested. Id. at 1352-53. The fact that Mendoza was a class
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the existence of the problem.
Assume, for example, that a defendant offers to settle for in-
junctive relief which is less comprehensive than the damages and in-
junctive relief which the plaintiff initially sought. Assume also that
injunctive relief or its equivalent is of special importance to the
plaintiff's attorney, who has entered the case with some sympathy
for the legal principles at stake. A promise by a defendant to cease
challenged conduct and to enter an enforceable consent agreement to
that effect secures those principles against future threat from the de-
fendant. It may also benefit individuals who are not parties to the
litigation. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's attorney may
advocate acceptance of the defendant's promise in lieu of damages
for the client, especially when a consent decree incorporating that
promise will satisfy the statutory prerequisite for a court award of
attorney's fees. Similarly, a plaintiff's attorney who has little or no
interest in the legal principles at stake may be tempted to relinquish
comprehensive demands for injunctive relief if he or she can prevail
for purposes of section 1988 by securing a more limited and presum-
ably less expensive promise from the defendant. In both situations,
the plaintiff would have prevailed under section 1988, and the attor-
ney would be eligible to file a claim for attorney's fees. An award of
fees would be legitimate under the statute even though the plaintiff's
interests may not have been fully protected by the attorney.
The conflict just described may be negotiated in part by the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, but Hensley
may also generate its own ethical dilemma for the attorney. 6 In
Hensley, the Court held that the amount of the fee to which an at-
torney is entitled under section 1988 is partially dependent on the
degree of the plaintiff's success.8 If a plaintiff does not secure all of
the relief originally sought, an attorney will be compensated for all
time reasonably expended as long as the plaintiff substantially
prevails.3 The district court has the discretion to determine what is
action highlighted the conflict. See also Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), and Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
35. The amicus brief of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights in White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Empi. Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982), acknowledged that the appearance of
this sort of impropriety resulted from fee negotiations. Levin, supra note 26, is especially con-
cerned about a defendant actually or apparently "buying off" a plaintiff's attorney. Id. at 516.
36. 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
37. Id. at 1941.
38. Id. at 1938, 1940.
1984]
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reasonable in light of the plaintiff's success.3 9
In Hensley, the Court stated that the basic formula for calculat-
ing a fee award consists of the number of hours expended in litiga-
tion multiplied by a reasonable fee rate.40 It cautioned, however,
that:
[i]f. . .a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited suc-
cess, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litiga-
tion as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an
excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiff's
claims were inter-related, nonfrivolous, and raised in good
faith. Congress has not authorized an award of fees whenever
it was reasonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or when-
ever conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and
skill."1
In other words, an attorney cannot be assured of full compensation
just because she has, in good faith, made reasonable efforts to secure
all of the relief requested by the plaintiff. The amount of the fee
depends on the "significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.'
Imagine, now, a situation in which the defendant offers to settle
and includes an offer of attorney's fees which will adequately com-
pensate the attorney for the time spent up to the point of the settle-
ment offer. The plaintiff, however, is not content with the defen-
dant's settlement offer and is interested in securing an additional
item of relief. If the attorney believes that any additional relief se-
cured after trial will be viewed by a court as a relatively insignificant
addition to the overall relief which the plaintiff could have secured
had the plaintiff accepted the defendant's settlement offer, the attor-
ney may fear that the court will rely on Hensley to deny a fully
compensatory fee for the additional time spent in bringing the case
to trial.
It is not clear whether the Hensley rationale will be extended to
reduce post-trial fee awards whenever a trial secures no or little
more relief than that which a defendant earlier offered in settlement.
Other fee statutes have been interpreted to require adjustment of a
39. Id. at 1939.
40. Id. at 1939-40.
41. Id. at 1941.
42. Id. at 1940.
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fee award in light of settlement negotiations."8 Two courts have held
that if a defendant's offer of settlement under Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 44 is not accepted and the plaintiff ulti-
mately recovers less than what was offered, the section 1988 fees
incurred by the plaintiff between the time of the offer and the con-
clusion of the lawsuit must be borne by the plaintiff." Another
court 4" has refused to hold that a rejection of a Rule 68 offer for
settlement can cut off a right to fees under section 1988, but left
open the decision as to what would constitute a reasonable fee under
those circumstances. 7 There is a possibility, therefore, either that
the Hensley decision will be read to permit reduction of a fee or that
Rule 68 itself will be interpreted to foreclose the award of a fee. 48
Thus, an attorney may reasonably fear that a court will ultimately
award a less than fully compensatory fee for litigation efforts under-
taken subsequent to rejection of a settlement offer. That fear may
tempt the attorney to ignore a client's willingness to continue litiga-
tion in the hope of additional relief."
43. Environmental Defense Fund v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1983) (a fee award
under the Equal Access to Justice Act should take into account the reasonableness of the
defendant's position during settlement negotiations). The language of this statute, however,
more directly requires this result than the language of § 1988.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 68, provides that - if the judgment finally obtained by [the plain-
tiff] is not more favorable than the offer [made by the defendant], the offeree must pay the
costs incurred after the making of the offer.
45. Bitsounis v. Sheraton Hartford Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 898 (D. Conn.
1983). (The court also stated, in dictum, that the plaintiff did not have to pay the costs and
fees incurred by the defendant subsequent to the rejected offer because to do so would be
inconsistent with the objectives of § 1988); and Walters v. Heublein, 485 F. Supp. 110 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
46. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3770
(April 23, 1984).
47. In Chesny, the court reviewed the impact which an offer of judgment made by the
defendant under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and rejected by the plaintiff,
would have on the plaintiff's recovery of a § 1988 fee award after trial. The plaintiff had
secured less comprehensive relief after trial than that which the defendant had offered in set-
tlement. The district court had concluded that the plaintiff could not receive any § 1988 fees
for time spent after rejection of the offer. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision. It remanded, however, so that the court could determine
what would be a reasonable fee under the circumstances. It is possible, therefore, that the
amount of the fee will be reduced under Hensley, although not denied entirely by the court.
48. For other cases construing Rule 68 in the context of a fee application, see Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the result); Fulps
v. City of Springfield, Tennessee, 715 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983); Pigeaud v. McLaren, 699
F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983); and Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978).
49. This may especially be the case in civil rights litigation in which plaintiffs are fre-
quently prone to be as interested in the establishment of a principle through the judicial reso-
lution of a controversy as in some practical form of individual relief. See Ginger, Legal
352 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
Finally, there is a danger that a defendant will attempt to ex-
ploit the conflict of interest so as to secure a more beneficial settle-
ment not by "buying off" the unethical plaintiff's attorney but by
putting an ethical plaintiff's attorney in such an untenable position
that the attorney will have to relinquish the fee claim. 50 A defendant
may offer, for example, to settle under terms which will result in less
than full or no compensation to the attorney. The offer may consist
of a lump sum, from which both the client and the attorney are ex-
pected to satisfy their claim to damages and compensation but which
is inadequate to do both. The defendant might also offer to settle
only if the request for an attorney's fee award is waived or substan-
tially reduced. 5' The conflict for the attorney confronted with these
offers of settlement is obvious. The temptation is for the attorney to
cease negotiating a settlement and to proceed to trial, despite the
fact that settlement may be in the client's best interests. The ethical
attorney will be forced to relinquish a fee claim which Congress in-
tended to secure for the attorney. 2
III. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS
Existing canons of professional ethics and disciplinary rules ad-
dress only indirectly the issues generated by the attorney's pecuniary
Processes - Litigation as a Form of Political Action, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (D. King & C. Quick eds. 1965).
50. See generally Levin, supra note 26. The amicus briefs filed in White v. New Hamp-
shire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982), by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights attest to the reality of these practices. The
latter brief argues that civil rights litigation is especially vulnerable to them.
51. In Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983), for example, the defendant
demanded a waiver. The NAACP's amicus brief in White asserts that defense counsel have
made requests for an "approximation" of the fees that will be sought and have conditioned
settlement on the defendant's view of the "reasonableness" of that approximation.
52. Other examples of the conflict of interest can easily be imagined. A plaintiff's attor-
ney, for example, might wish to forego a settlement acceptable to the plaintiff if § 1988
promises a large and fully compensatory fee award subsequent to trial. This might occur in a
case in which success is highly likely but the client wishes to settle for his or her own reasons.
Perhaps the client is simply weary of the emotional costs of litigation.
One interesting conflict has been described to the author by a colleague. His client was
arrested and subjected to criminal prosecution under circumstances which strongly suggested
bad faith on the part of the state. On behalf of his client, the attorney filed a lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to halt the prosecution. The complaint requested an award of attorney's fees
under § 1988. Subsequent to the filing of the § 1988 claim, the state made an offer to drop the
prosecution if the attorney would relinquish his claim for fees. The attorney asked a simple
question: If the state's offer is itself unethical because it may be a solicitation of a bribe, how
can I appropriately respond to that offer if to do so in an ethical fashion would jeopardize my
client's interest in not being prosecuted?
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interest in litigation under statutory fee provisions. No clear guid-
ance is given to either plaintiff's or defendant's counsel as to appro-
priate standards of conduct. Attorneys are simply to avoid conflicts
of interest.58 Although the canons of professional ethics and discipli-
nary rules are no more specific regarding many other troublesome
aspects of legal representation, at least there are traditions and rou-
tine practices which have long been accepted as proper and with
which most attorneys are familiar. 4 There are, however, no such
traditions or practices governing the negotiation of fees when a fee
request has been made under section 1988.
It has been proposed that existing canons and rules be amended
so as to provide clear guidelines to proper conduct during settlement
negotiations.5 5 The difficult question for courts and attorneys, how-
ever, is not to decide whether to amend the canons and rules but
rather to decide what guidelines should be incorporated into them.
That question is also at the heart of other suggested solutions to the
conflict of interest problem.
A. Retainer Agreements
One proposed solution to ethical problems inherent in settlement
negotiations under section 1988 is for the plaintiff's attorney to insist
on a retainer agreement which sets forth the terms on which the
attorney agrees to represent the client." The retainer agreement
might serve two purposes. First, it might disclose to the client the
fact that the attorney has a substantial interest in the outcome of the
litigation and might also attempt to resolve and memorialize in writ-
ing, in advance of settlement negotiations, the rights and obligations
of the client and the attorney regarding claims which become subject
to negotiation. Alternatively, it might provide that the attorney's
53. E.g., MODEL CODE.OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, DR 5-103, DR 5-
107 (1979). See also Committee on Professional Responsibility and Judicial Ethics, New York
City Bar Ass'n Op. 80-84 (Sept. 18, 1981).
54. Contingent fee agreements, for example, have traditionally been viewed with some
suspicion, see supra note 30. Nevertheless, their use is a commonly accepted practice, see
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1982), and a considerable body of
case law and scholarly comment guide the practicing attorney in their use. See, e.g., In re
Kerr's Estate, 63 Cal. 2d 875, 409 P.2d 931, 48 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1966); Brillhart v. Hudson,
169 Colo. 329, 455 P.2d 878 (1969); Anderson v. Kenelly, 37 Colo. App. 217, 547 P.2d 260
(1975); Chalmers v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 263 Or. 449, 502 P.2d 1378 (1972); F. MACKIN-
NON, supra note 30; S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES (1973). See also the cases and commentary
noted in Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983).
55. Levin, supra note 26 at 520-21.
56. Id. at 520.
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compensation would not be dependent on any amount awarded as
fees under section 1988.'
Disclosure to the client of the attorney's interest in the outcome
of the litigation is worthwhile. It provides partial protection from
subsequent allegations that the client was ignorant of the potential
conflict of interest and thus agreed to a settlement to which she
might otherwise have objected. Ethical rules governing the legal pro-
fession frequently utilize the device of disclosure to ensure profes-
sional integrity.58
An attempt to go beyond disclosure and to predetermine the
rights and obligations of both attorney and client, however, would
probably fall short of a satisfactory resolution of the conflict of inter-
est inherent in settlement negotiations under section 1988. Any re-
tainer provision which may be construed as a limitation on the abil-
t/ity of the client to settle is likely to be declared invalid.59 An
attorney cannot insist, for example, on a right to participate equally
with the client in determining the propriety of settlement.6
Other types of retainer provisions, such as those which acknowl-
edge the authority of the client to control the terms of settlement but
which also provide for a readjusted basis of compensation if the cli-
ent's decision jeopardizes the attorney's interest in a fee, may also be
inadequate. Their practical value, as well as their legal validity, is
questionable.
Imagine, for example, a retainer agreement providing that the
attorney expects to be compensated through a statutory fee award
but also providing, in the event the client settles for an award of fees
which is less than what the attorney could reasonably have expected
to receive from a court,"' that the client will be obligated to make up
the difference. In the alternative, imagine a retainer agreement pro-
viding that, if the client refuses to settle and the relief received after
trial is not significantly greater than the relief offered through settle-
ment, the client will reimburse the attorney for those additional
57. This solution is proposed in Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Effi-
ciency, and Fairness in the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 207, 251
n.236 (1984).
58. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 and DR 5-104-
A (1982), which require full disclosure to the client before the attorney may enter any rela-
tionship with the client or a third party which has the potential of creating a conflict of
interest.
59. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 30, at 75.
60. Id. at 76. (Contingent fee contract clauses which penalize a client for settling
against the attorney's advice are invalid.)
61. See supra discussion accompanying notes 50-51.
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hours spent in litigation for which the attorney will receive no or
inadequate compensation under Rule 68 or Hensley v. Eckerhart.
62
It is possible that provisions of this nature would be declared invalid
limitations on a client's ability to settle. When similar provisions are
included in contingent fee contracts, they are usually determined to
be unenforceable." Alternatively, a court might decide that ethical
constraints as well as section 1988 preclude a retainer agreement
from providing greater attorney compensation than that allowed by a
court under section 1988.1"
In addition to the uncertain legal validity of these particular re-
tainer provisions, there is a practical difficulty of equal if not greater
dimension. One of the assumptions made by Congress when it
adopted section 1988 was that civil rights were not being adequately
enforced because persons whose rights were violated did not have the
financial resources to hire an attorney. 5 There is no reason to believe
that this assumption is less valid today than it was in 1976. Attor-
neys undertaking representation of a typical civil rights client know
that the client will be unable to compensate them for their services.
The retainer provisions described above are, therefore, useless from
the attorney's perspective. Only in those rare instances in which the
difference between the attorney's expectations of compensation and
the court award or the fee negotiated through settlement is not large
could an attorney expect a client to make up the difference.
For similar reasons, any attempt entirely to divorce attorney
compensation from the statutory fee entitlement will be unsatisfac-
tory. This solution assumes that a court will award a statutory fee to
62. See supra discussion accompanying notes 36-49.
63. See supra note 61. Compare the standard provision of contingent fee contracts that,
if the case goes to trial, the percentage of the attorney's share of any recovery will increase.
64. In Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983), the court of appeals held that
"if the client's section 1988 fee award, calculated as set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart .. , is
less than the amount owed to the attorney under the contingent fee agreement, then the lawyer
will be expected to reduce his fee to the amount awarded by the courts." Id. at 1506-07. The
court's opinion was based partially on the legislative intent of § 1988 and partially on profes-
sional canons of ethics. For other cases which discuss the relationship between statutory fee
awards and fee contracts, see United Slate, Tile, and Composition Roofers, Damp and Water-
proof Workers Ass'n, Local 307 v. G&M Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 115 L.R.R.M. 3700
(6th Cir. 1984) (a fee contract does not set an upper limit on the amount of a statutory fee
award under the FLSA); Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1984); Lenard v.
Argento, 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1983) (a contingent fee contract does not set an automatic
upper limit to a § 1988 fee award); Sullivan v. Crown Paper Board Co., Inc., 52 U.S.L.W.
2266 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 1983); and Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 340 N.W.2d 704,
115 Wis. 2d 289 (1983); Sanchez v. Schwartz, 688 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1982).
65. See supra note 6, and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff rather than to the plaintiff's attorney and that the attor-
ney will then be compensated by the plaintiff, according to the terms
of the retainer agreement." The utility of separating actual compen-
sation from the amount of a fee award is limited, for the most part,
to cases in which monetary damages are sought as relief.17 A contin-
gent fee agreement simply does not work if equitable relief is the
primary objective of the lawsuit. Furthermore, a contingent fee
agreement cannot bind members of a class represented by an indi-
vidual plaintiff and, therefore, is not an effective solution for class
actions." Finally, it is not clear that such a contingent fee arrange-
ment could be enforced in a manner consistent with the objectives of
section 1988. Courts have ignored the provisions of contingent fee
contracts which, if enforced, would undercut the purposes of section
1988.69 One of the purposes of section 1988 is to ensure that a client
is reimbursed for legal expenses. If a client is awarded a statutory
fee and then is permitted to compensate the attorney according to
the terms of a contingent fee agreement, the client may receive a
windfall from the award if the agreement obligates the client to pay
the attorney less than the full amount of the award. Providing a
windfall to the plaintiff was not-an objective desired by Congress
when it adopted section 1988.0
The retainer agreement would, of course, be useful if it con-
tained a formula by which a lump sum settlement would be divided
between the attorney and client. If the attorney and the client were
both willing to accept the lump sum offer, any potential dispute over
the amount of the fee to which the attorney was entitled would be
avoided. If, however, the settlement as divided under the formula
would not provide what the attorney would consider adequate com-
pensation, there would still be an incentive for the attorney to reject
settlement, even if it was in the client's best interests. Retainer
agreements are useful devices for disclosing to clients the conflict of
interest inherent in a case in which an attorney expects to be paid
under a fee statute but, as a practical and legal matter, they are
unsatisfactory devices for eliminating the conflict of interest.
66. Green, supra note 58, at 251 n.236.
67. Id. at 251 n. 236.
68. Id.
69. E.g., Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983).
70. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933, 1947 (1983) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part) (fee awards should be structured so as not to permit an attorney to "lard" win-
ning cases solely to augment income), SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
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B. Judicial Scrutiny of Settlement Agreements
Another suggestion for coping with the ethical problem inherent
in settlement negotiations when an attorney has a claim to a statu-
tory fee is close judicial scrutiny of settlement agreements to protect
the client's interests. Courts routinely and carefully review settle-
ments in class action litigation to ensure that the named plaintiff and
attorney have not sacrificed the interests of class members in favor
of their own.71 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires court review of approval of class action settlements72 which
may entail a full hearing so that the court is able to assess the pro-
priety and reasonableness of the proposed fee.7 3 The burden of estab-
lishing the fairness of a settlement agreement in a class action rests
with the proponents of the settlement. 4
Section 1988 does not require judicial approval of consent judg-
ments, although other statutes do embody such a requirement.7 "
Thus, in section 1988 actions which are not prosecuted on behalf of
a class, it becomes important to determine whether a court has the
ability to condition the entry of a consent order on its approval of the
terms, of the settlement agreement. Although there will be no oppor-
tunity for judicial scrutiny to provide a check on conflicts of interest
if a consent order is not sought,' in most instances a civil rights
plaintiff will want a settlement agreement incorporated into a con-
sent decree to ensure enforceability of the agreement." A court may
71. Many of the cases discussed in this article involved judicial scrutiny of class action
settlements. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Shlensky v.
Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1978); and Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind.
1983).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), provides that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court .. " See also FED. R. Ov. P. 23.1 & 23.2.
73. See, e.g., the description of the necessary review set forth in Parker v. Anderson, 667
F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1982) and Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
75. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 50 (bankruptcy suits); 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (antitrust suits). Cf.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Maryland v. United States, 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1240
(1983), in which he suggests that the requirement of judicial approval of agreements to which
the Justice Department has consented may unconstitutionally interfere with the authority of
the executive branch to implement the laws.
76. The court in Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52
U.S.L.W. 3770 (S. Ct. April 23, 1984), suggests that a client who believes that an attorney is
not negotiating with proper concern for the client's interest may ask the court to intervene to
arbitrate the negotiations. Id. at 478. It is unclear, however, whether a client will have the
assertiveness or the knowledge to make a direct approach to the court a realistic option.
77. An attorney may also want court approval to protect himself from potential subse-
quent allegations of improper representation. See Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instru-
ment for Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1329 (1959) (a fiduciary may
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scrutinize the terms of a proposed settlement agreement if -a consent
decree is sought.
When a consent decree is requested, the court's authority to re-
view the terms of a proposed settlement in which an attorney's fee
has been negotiated derives from several sources.78 First, courts have
recognized authority to supervise members of the bar so as to protect
clients from unethical attorney conduct7 9 and the legal profession
from distrust.80 Courts have relied on this authority to set general
guidelines for contingent fee contracts 1 and to set upper limits to fee
recoveries in specific cases."2
In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 can be interpreted to extend ap-
proval authority to courts. Section 1988 gives courts discretion to
award attorney's fees. Congress provided for discretionary awards as
a partial check on unethical conduct which some feared section 1988
would encourage." If a court is asked to approve a consent decree
which includes a provision for attorney's fees negotiated in settle-
ment of a section 1988 claim, the court should exercise its discretion
to approve or reject in such a way that the congressional intent un-
derlying section 1988 is not undermined.8 4 The attorney's fee provi-
seek voluntary approval to protect himself).
78. Compare Levin, supra note 26 at 517, who suggests that judicial supervision is nec-
essarily limited to class action settlements.
79. Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108-10 (3d Cir. 1979). See F. MACKIN-
NON, supra note 30, at 23-24, who states that a court may exercise its "equity jurisdiction over
fiduciary relations, in this case, the lawyer-client relationships," as well as "its special power
over activities of members of the bar" to review attorney fees.
80. Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108-10 (3d Cir. 1979); Levin v. Missis-
sippi River Corp., 377 F. Supp. 926, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475
F.2d 137, 140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 111 (1973); Farmington Dowell Prod. Co. v.
Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 88 n.60 (1st Cir. 1970).
81. F. MACKINNON, supra note 30, at 23-24.
82. See supra the cases cited in notes 79 and 80, Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th
Cir. 1983) (attorney cannot recover more than fee award set by court under § 1988, despite
provision of contingent fee contract); and Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978)
(court may set an upper limit to attorney's fee, despite provisions of contingent fee contract).
83. The primary congressional concern was that attorneys would stir up frivolous or
harassing litigation given the prospect of a § 1988 fee recovery. See SunCOMMIrrEE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 4, 11, 75, 215, and the discussion in Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil
Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 351 (1980). See
also infra notes 151-54, and accompanying text.
84. See Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982). Cf Environmental Defense Fund
v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1983) (the purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act
require a searching review of the litigation process, even when that process culminates in a
settlement); Farmington Dowell Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 88 n.60 (1st Cir.
1970) (settlement of statutory attorney's fee should be reviewed to ensure that intent of the
antitrust statute is effectuated); and Foster v. Boise Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.
Tex. 1976), afd, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title VII requires review of settlement
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sion should not be approved if it reflects unethical conduct which
Congress attempted to constrain when it adopted section 1988.
A court also has a legitimate interest in not approving a consent
decree which it would not enforce.85 If an attorney unethically com-
promises a claim of his client for his own advantage, a consent judg-
ment incorporating that unethical compromise may be subject to di-
rect or collateral attack.86 Thus, a court may review a settlement
agreement to assure itself that .the terms of the agreement are
enforceable.
Finally, courts have authority to review proposed consent judg-
ments if the public interest might be adversely affected. 7 One court
has explicitly held that judicial review of fee settlements under sec-
tion 1988 is warranted because courts have a special responsibility to
the public under fee-shifting statutes. In Jones v. Amalgamated
Warbasse Houses,88 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that this special responsibility justified a district court in reduc-
ing the amount of a fee award agreed to during a settlement. The
district court had found no evidence of collusion or ethical impropri-
ety in the settlement negotiations. It simply believed that the hourly
rate to which the parties had agreed for purposes of computing the
fee was out of line with the hourly rates generally used by courts in
awarding fees. 89 The court of appeals stated that the district court
was authorized in its actions if it believed revision of the settlement
agreement would promote confidence in the judicial process90 and
ensure that public perception of the appropriateness of the award
would not be offended.91 Thus, courts have ample authority to review
settlements of section 1988 fee claims.
9 2
agreement).
85. See Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument for Compromise and Settle-
ment, supra note 78, at 1316-17.
86. Id. at 1321-34.
87. Id. at 1316.
88. 721 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1983).
89. Id. at 883.
90. Id. at 885.
91. Id. Other decisions in which courts have supervised the amount of § 1988 fee awards
include Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983) and Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d
645 (ist Cir. 1978).
92. Compare the exercise of judicial discretion to review settlement agreements in which
defendants, in anticipation of an equitable (rather than a statutory) fee award, attempt to
resolve the fee issue during settlement negotiations. For example, although courts have no
statutory authority to award antitrust plaintiffs an attorney's fee if the plaintiffs prevail
through settlement, Hew Corp. v. Tandy Corp., 480 F. Supp. 758, 760 (D. Mass. 1979); City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American
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Despite recognized judicial authority to review proposed settle-
ments, there are several reasons why that review will not adequately/ resolve the conflict of interest problem inherent in settlement negoti-
ations. First, as a practical matter, in a lawsuit which is not prose-
cuted as a class action, courts have historically been reluctant to in-
terfere with settlement agreements.93 Judicial review of these
settlement agreements may not be conducted as thoroughly or as rig-
orously as the review conducted under Rule 23."1
A more significant difficulty with judicial scrutiny of settlement
agreements is that such a review is retrospective.95 Judicial review of
proposed settlements is intended, to help the court determine whether
the settlement agreement reveals an actual conflict of interest, not to
eliminate prospectively a potential conflict between attorney and
client.
In a retrospective review, there may be many factors relevant to
the question of whether the attorney subordinated the client's inter-
est to her own.9 Those factors ihclude the terms of the settlement
agreement which, on their face, may reveal the conflict.9 A court
may also consider whether the settled relief amounts to a fraction of
the plaintiff's potential recovery, and it may compare the strength of
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1973), they have asserted
an equitable power to make such an award, e.g., City of Detroit, 495 F.2d at 469; Lindy Bros.,
487 F.2d at 165-66, and review settlements of fee claims. See Note, Attorney's Fees in Indi-
vidual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1656, 1675-78 (1972).
93. Compare Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1983) (settlements are accorded a presumption of regularity) with Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D.
455 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (the burden of establishing the fairness of a settlement agreement in a
Rule 23 action rests with the proponents). Cf. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119
(1932) (the proponent of modification of a consent decree previously entered, with the ap-
proval of all concerned, bears a heavy burden). Levin, supra note 26, may therefore be correct
as a practical if not a legal matter that judicial review of settlement agreements will not ade-
quately address the conflict of interest problem.
94. See, e.g., State of Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D.
III. 1972) (court reviews fees on behalf of class members, but does not interfere with contin-
gency provision for the named client).
95. Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CA-
LIF. L. Rav. 1656, 1675 (1972), identifies this as a problem with judicial scrutiny of settlement
agreements even in a Rule 23 class action.
96. Cf. International Travel v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255, 1277 (8th Cir. 1980);
and Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1110 (3d Cir. 1979) (the court lists the factors
which it may review to determine whether a contingent fee contract represents an unethical
bargain between attorney and client).
97. See People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1979). Attorneys are to avoid both the fact and the
appearance of "windfall fees", Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933 (1983); City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
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the case on the merits to the settled amount.9" A court may take into
account whether a government agency, such as the Justice Depart-
ment, has concurred in the agreement if the court believes that the
government would likely not concur in a settlement which is the
product of attorney overreaching." A court might also seek to deter-
mine whether a particular, questionable settlement reflects a pattern
of similar, equally questionable dealings with clients. 100 In most in-
stances the question of whether a conflict of interest has affected the
settlement will not be easily answered. Because of the nature of the
factual inquiry, the retrospective review is not likely to uncover all or
even most instances in which an ' Vttorney subordinates the client's
interest to her own.' 01 The conflict' would be more readily identifiable
if a court could review the process of negotiations rather than, sim-
ply, the terms of the settlement agreement. There is, however, no
record of settlement negotiations:'Moreover, courts cannot rely on
the usual adversary process to reveal evidence of collusion if there is
a possibility that the plaintiff's attorney has been bought off by the
defendant. Neither plaintiff's nordefendant's attorney would have
an interest in bringing evidence of .that collusion before the court. 02
Finally, judicial review of settlement agreements puts the court
in an adversarial position with which a court may not be entirely
comfortable. Courts have expressed concern at being asked to as-
sume an adversarial role, 03 and one has even appointed a guardian
ad litem to represent the interests of parties whose interests had ar-
guably been unethically ignored by an attorney. 04 The retrospective
review is, therefore, institutionally as well as substantively difficult to
pursue with success.
98. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d t Cir. 1974).
99. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980).
100. Lynn v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665 (D. Ariz. 1978), and Munoz v. Arizona State
Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670 (D. Ariz. 1978).
101. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1977), in
which the court carefully reviewed an allegation that the settlement agreement reached was
the product of unethical conduct. The court concluded that the record did not support the
allegation. Id. at 424. See also City of Philadelphia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454,
470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
102. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 399, 441 (1973).
103. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977).
104. Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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C. Bifurcated Settlement Negotiations: Prandini v. National
Tea Co.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
proposed another solution to the conflict of interest problem inherent
in settlement negotiations in statutory fee cases. In Prandini v. Na-
tional Tea Co.,10 5 a damages award and attorney's fees were negoti-
ated simultaneously. The court insisted that settlement procedures
be conducted with propriety.' 08 It recognized that the simultaneous
negotiation of fees and merits raised the possibility that the fee
agreement was made at the expense of the client and represented a
"sweetheart contract" with the defendant. 107 The Prandini court
suggested, therefore, that trial cMirts:
insist upon settlement of the damage aspect of the case sepa-
rately from the award of statutorily authorized attorneys'
fees. Only after court approval of the damage settlement
should discussion and negotiation of appropriate compensa-
tion for the attorneys begin. This would eliminate . . . , in
practical effect, one fund divided between the attorney and
client.108  ,,
Prandini requires a bifurcated settlement procedure; neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant is able to merge negotiations of fees and
merits in any case. 0 9
The Prandini solution is not a completely satisfactory method of
coping with the attorney's fee conflict of interest inherent in settle-
ment negotiations. First, it is unrealistic to believe that the parties
105. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
106. Id. at 1021.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Usually, it is advantageous to the defendant to merge negotiations, because the
defendant has an interest in settling all of the elements of the case and disposing of the entire
liability at one time. In some situations, however, it may also be to the plaintiff's advantage to
attempt to merge negotiations. If a plaintiff has a relatively weak (but plausible) case on the
merits, a claim for attorney's fees may be used in settlement negotiations to persuade the
defendant to agree to give some relief to the plaintiff. The quid pro quo would be the relin-
quishment of the claim for fees. Levin, supra note 26, at 517, assumes that Prandini restricts
only the conduct of plaintiff's counsel and that defendants are free, under Prandini, to make
lump sum offers of settlement or otherwise to inject the fee issue into settlement negotiations.
Levin's interpretation of Prandini is unnecessarily narrow but, if adopted, is a serious defect in
the Prandini solution to the ethical problem. Note that the new ABA MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.4(a), provide that it is "professional mis-conduct for a lawyer to
• . . knowingly assist or induce another to [violate the Rules of Professional Conduct]." See
also Committee on Professional Repsonsibility and Judicial Ethics, New York City Bar Ass'n
Op. 80-84 (Sept. 18, 1981).
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negotiating a settlement will not take into account the possibility of
a statutory fee award, even if attorney's fees are not discussed during
negotiation of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. A request for statu-
tory attorney's fees is frequently included in the complaint and, even
if it is not, the participants in the negotiation sessions are, or ought
to be, aware of the potential claim.' 10 If one can assume that courts
will clarify the guidelines for calculating a reasonable fee subsequent
to settlement,1 ' then all parties can roughly calculate what would be
an appropriate fee. Negotiation of the merits will proceed on an im-
plicit understanding of what a reasonable fee claim would be, and
that understanding will inevitably influence the negotiation. Defen-
dants may provide a cushion for subsequent fee claims when negoti-
ating the merits of a settlement, and plaintiffs' attorneys, cognizant
of the defendants' strategy, may not vigorously protest the strategy
because the amount of the fee is at stake. Worse yet, the attorneys
on each side may even be tempted to enter into collusion to the detri-
ment of the plaintiff's interest.
11 2
If the Prandini court's objective of excluding the attorney's fee
issue from settlement negotiations on the merits can be satisfied only
by an initial settlement agreement which is completely silent on the
subject of attorney's fees, there is a further difficulty associated with
the Prandini bifurcated settlement procedure. Prandini precludes the
negotiation of fees at the time the merits of the case are settled, but
110. Fee applications may appear for the first time after judgment, as in White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982). See generally E. LARSON, supra note 4,
for a discussion of the procedural characteristics of fee applications; and Green, supra note 57,
at 246, for a discussion of whether a fee claim should be included in the complaint.
11. See infra notes 190-214 and accompanying text. If no guidelines exist for calculat-
ing a reasonable fee subsequent to settlement, adherence to Prandini may have the unfortunate
consequence of discouraging settlement negotiations. A defendant may be unwilling to settle
unless his total liability, including that for fees, is resolved. If negotiations are bifurcated, and
the defendant has no way of calculating his total liability, he may prefer to proceed to trial.
Thus, although Prandini may encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to engage in settlement discus-
sions by removing the defendant's opportunity to exploit a conflict of interest, it may discour-
age defendants from pursuing negotiations. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec.,
455 U.S. 445 (1982), in which the Court notes that defendants may legitimately insist on
knowing the extent of their total liability before settling. Levin, supra note 26, at 517, dis-
cusses this concern. Green, supra note 58, at 249-50, rejects Prandini because it precludes a
defendant from knowing the total extent of liability. See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION, §§ 1.46 and 1.47 (4th ed. 1977), which acknowledges the legitimacy of simultaneous
negotiations as a means of ensuring that defendants know the extent of their liability. Com-
pare Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724, 726 (N.D. Ind. 1983), in which the court requires
bifurcated negotiations in part to avoid interference with the policy of encouraging good faith
efforts by plaintiffs to settle, with White.
112. Note, Attorney's Fees, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 800 n. 12 (1978).
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it does not necessarily preclude the absolute waiver of fees at that
time. The Prandini court was concerned only about the conflict
posed when a settlement provides for a lump sum from which both
attorney and client are expected to satisfy their claims. 113 That con-
cern is different from the issue which arises when there is a question
of fee waiver. The problem with permitting a defendant to demand a
fee waiver is that an ethical plaintiff's attorney may be forced to
relinquish a valid claim, a claim which Congress intended to exist to
fulfill important legislative objectives, in order to represent her cli-
ent's interests effectively.
114
Because Prandini did not provide an analysis of or a solution for
the waiver issue, if the initial settlement reached under Prandini
does not mention or reserve for subsequent negotiation the pending
claim for fees, the court has no way of knowing whether the plaintiff,
through the settlement agreement, has relinquished a claim to attor-
ney's fees.11 If the plaintiff eventually files a claim, the defendant
may argue that a settlment agreement which does not mention the
pending fee claim was intended by the parties to dispose of all claims
related to the litigation. "' In that event, a court will be required to
spend time resolving the issue of the parties' intent.11 7 Silence may
113. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
114. See Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983), for that analysis.
115. Even the defendant may not know whether the plaintiff has intended to relinquish a
fee claim until many months have passed. In White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec.,
455 U.S. 445 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a claim for attorney's fees is not governed
by the ten-day time limit of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The majority
did not determine whether a fee request should be governed by the time limitations set forth in
Rules 54(d) and 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 454. Nevertheless, it did
appear to approve of the decision in Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981), in which the court held Rules 54(d) and 58 inapplicable to a fee
request. Thus, barring surprise, see note 119 infra and accompanying text, or a local rule
providing for a time limitation on the filing of a fee request, see White, 455 U.S. at 454, a
valid fee request may be filed many months after judgment on the merits. In White, the com-
plaint did not include a request for fees and a motion for fees was not filed until four and one-
half months after a settlement was reached. Subsequent to settlement, a defendant could, of
course, ask the plaintiff whether a fee request will be made. There is no assurance of an
answer. More importantly, a defendant may not wish to remind the plaintiff of his right to
claim a fee award by asking the question.
116. See the arguments made by the defendants in White v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Empl. Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 699 n.2 and 705 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982); Burke
v. Guiney, 700 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1983); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 722 F.2d 1009 (2d
Cir. 1983); Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. I11. 1978); and Balcaen v.
Herschberger, 415 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
117. It is the parties' intent which determines the validity of the fee claim subsequent to
settlement. See the discussion in Brown v. General Motors Corp., 722 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.
1983); and Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 132 (10th Cir. 1980).
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be construed as a waiver of any claim to attorney's fees. 18 Finally,
even if silence is not construed as a waiver of an attorney's fees
claim, a court may in its discretion deny a fee award if a fee request
comes as a surprise to the defendant." 9 Courts may also deny fee
requests if the defendant has been misled or if there are other cir-
cumstances which would render a fee award unjust.1 "'
A settlement agreement negotiated in strict adherence to
Prandini such that it does not mention the fee issue is, therefore, as
likely to generate as to conclude litigation. On the other hand, if a
court attempts to avoid litigation over issues of waiver or surprise
and encourages plaintiffs to reveal their intentions by reserving the
claim to attorney's fees in the initial settlement agreement, the effec-
tiveness of the Prandini procedure will be undermined. Negotiation
of the merits will be affected by explicit reservation of the pending
fee claim.'
The response of courts to the Prandini proposal of mandatory
bifurcated settlement negotiations has been mixed. Some have distin-
guished Prandini on a factual basis.' 2 Some have indicated approval
118. Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Benitez v. Collazo, 571 F.
Supp. 246, 249 (D.P.R. 1983), in which the court suggests that Aho is no longer good law in
the Ninth Circuit. Many more courts have refused to construe silence in this way. See, e.g.,
Burke v. Guiney, 700 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1983); Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 624
F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980); Benitez v. Collazo, 571 F. Supp. 246 (D.P.R. 1983); Regalado v.
Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. II1. 1978); and Balcaen v. Herschberger, 415 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.
Wis. 1976). Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). Finding a waiver from
silence alone would appear to be inconsistent with the congressional intent not to penalize
counsel for seeking a settlement. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 215.
119. In White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982), the consent
agreement was silent on the fee question, but the Supreme Court nonetheless approved an
award of fees. It did, however, caution that courts have discretion to deny fee requests if they
come as a surprise. Id. at 454. See also Baird v. Bellotti, No. 83-1167 slip. op. (1st Cir. Jan.
13, 1984); and FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
120. See, e.g., Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980),
and Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1979).
121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
122. In Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1982), the challenged settlement
agreement provided for a single fund from which both class relief and attorney's fees were to
be paid. The court was to determine the amount of the fee. For that reason, compliance with
the Prandini procedure was not mandated. Id. at 1213-14. The court of appeals stated that
"the evil feared...can best be met by a careful district judge, sensitive to the problem [of
unscrupulous attorneys negotiating large fees at the expense of an inadequate settlement for
the client], properly evaluating the adequacy of the settlement for the class and determining
and setting a reasonable attorney's fee .. " Id. at 1214. In Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131
(3d Cir. 1978), the court of appeals refused to require compliance with the Prandini procedure
because the settlement did not involve "one fund," as in Prandini, and the defendant was not
indifferent to the allocation of the settlement fund between attorney's fees and class relief. Id.
at 150. Cf. McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1977) (the court
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of the procedure as a method of avoiding conflicts of interest, but
have not had occasion to order the parties to comply with the proce-
dure.128 One has encouraged attorneys voluntarily to comply with
the procedure and has stated that simultaneous negotiations of the
fees and merits will cause it to scrutinize carefully any settlement
agreement to determine whether other circumstances "neutralize the
potential for impropriety."124 The Supreme Court of the United
States has indicated that it would not approve of the Prandini
mandatory procedure because "[i]n considering whether to enter a
negotiated settlement, a defendant may have good reason to demand
to know his total liability from both damages and fees."12 Only one
court has directly ordered parties to comply with the Prandini proce-
reserved judgment on the Prandini issue because the record did not support the allegation of a
conflict of interest).
123. In Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1983), a party objected to an anti-
trust class action settlement because the court "permitted fee discussions to take place and
agreement on the fee to be reached before all substantive issues affecting the class had been
resolved." Id. at 432. The appellate court simply remanded the case to the trial court for
resolution of factual questions pertaining to the fee award. Although it repeated the objector's
question regarding negotiations, it did not state definitively that Prandini should be followed.
Id. at 435-36. In Benitez v. Collazo, 571 F. Supp. 246 (D.P.R.) 1983) and Regalado v. John-
son, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. Ill. 1978), the courts entertained fee requests submitted subsequent
to the approval of consent agreements which did not mention the fee issue. They did not con-
strue the agreements as waivers of the fee because "[the attorney's] interest in the fee makes it
improper for the lawyer . . . to inject the question of attorney's fees into the balance of settle-
ment discussions." Regalado, 79 F.R.D. at 451 (citing Prandini). See also Benitez, 571 F.
Supp. at 249; Folsom v. Butte County Ass'n of Governments, 32 Cal. 3d 668, 652 P.2d 437,
186 Cal. Rptr 589 (1982). In Munoz v. Arizona State University, 80 F.R.D. 670 (D. Ariz.
1980), and Lyon v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665 (D. Ariz. 1978), the fact that fees and merits were
negotiated simultaneously was used by the court to explain its refusal to certify the named
plaintiff as an adequate class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Other courts which have noted the ethical problems associated with simultaneous negoti-
ation but have not discussed Prandini include Gram v. Bank of Louisiana, 691 F.2d 728 (5th
Cir. 1982); Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 503 n.l (5th Cir. 1981);
Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1315 (4th Cir. 1978); and City of Philadelphia v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
124. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980).
125. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453 n.15 (1982). The
Court did not directly reject the Prandini rule. It merely, refused to rest its decision in White
on a rationale which implicitly would have approved the Prandini procedure. See supra note
111, and accompanying text. Compare the rationale in Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 582 (8th Cir. 1981), which was discussed in White. Levin, supra
note 26 at 519, states that the court in Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass.
1977) (the citation is not to the settlement phase of the litigation), refused to prohibit a defen-
dant from discussing fee waiver during settlement negotiations because of views similar to
those of the Supreme Court that there is necessarily a give and take in the negotiations. This
article rejects the suggestion that defendants have no way of making a reasonable estimate of
fee liability which may be imposed by a court subsequent to a settlement of the merits. See
infra notes 189-214, and accompanying text.
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dure.126 Courts recognize the ethical problems posed by settlement
negotiations in cases in which a statutory fee award is available, but
they are not uniformly willing to require bifurcated negotiations to
avoid those difficulties.
27
It has been suggested that plaintiffs' attorneys voluntarily resort
to the Prandini procedure to avoid the appearance of improper con-
duct during negotiations. 2 8 Although voluntary compliance sounds
useful,12 9 it will not necessarily achieve the intended objective. A de-
fendant may simply refuse to go along with the suggestion. More-
over, because it is not clear that voluntary compliance with the
Prandini procedure will always be in the best interests of the plain-
tiff, the procedure must be used with caution. If the defendant's lia-
bility is sufficiently uncertain and a substantial amount of attorney
time has been expended by the plaintiff's attorney in preparing for
trial, the defendant may be unwilling to discuss settlement if negoti-
ations do not include the fee claim. It is when the defendant's liabil-
ity is uncertain that the plaintiff has the greatest interest in settle-
ment. Thus, insistence on adherence to the Prandini procedure in all
negotiations might actually work to the disadvantage of the
plaintiff.13 0
The Prandini procedure does much to minimize the potential
conflict of interest between attorney and client, but it is a procedure
which is in need of refinement if it is not to create, through inflexible
application or failure to confront the waiver issue," as many
problems as it solves. Its chief defect, however, is that it only
postpones and does not eliminate the negotiation of the fee question.
As long as fees are negotiable and attorneys are aware of that fact,
the conflict of interest cannot be completely avoided.
126. Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983). The court justified its order
not only because of the ethical problems generated by simultaneous negotiation of the fees and
merits but also because of the policies which led to the adoption of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the
policy of encouraging good faith efforts to settle.
127. Judicial authority to require bifurcated negotiations is supported by FED. R. Civ.
P. 42(b), as well as by the many other sources of authority discussed in this article.
128. ' Levin, supra note 26 at 521.
129. Id.; see also Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 448 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
130. Levin, supra note 26 at 520, states that the client must always be consulted before
voluntary resort to Prandini is made because of the possibility that the procedure will not be
conducive to securing the best settlement for the client.
131. The Committee on Professional Responsibility and Judicial Ethics of the New York
City Bar Association has taken the position that a defendant's insistence that fee claims be
entirely or partially waived as a condition to settlement is unethical, because it prejudices a
vital aspect of the administration of justice and interferes with efforts to make counsel availa-
ble to those who cannot afford it. New York City Bar Ass'n, Op. 80-84 (Sept. 18, 1981).
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D. Trial Strategems
Attorneys have resorted to various trial strategems designed to
achieve the effects of fee non-negotiability. These attorney-generated
responses to the conflict of interest inherent in a system which per-
mits fee negotiability are undesirable because they tend to consume
judicial time and resources.There are two devices which an attorney
might use to ensure judicial involvement in the fee question and
thereby achieve the effect of fee non-negotiability. The first requires
silence regarding the fee issue during negotiation of the merits of the
claim. A plaintiff's attorney may choose not to introduce the subject
of fees into the negotiation or, perhaps, not even include a specific
request for fees in the original complaint. Subsequent to the comple-
tion of settlement negotiations and the entry of a consent order, that
attorney is apparently free to petition the court for an award of
fees."' If the attorney adopts this strategem, a court will find itself
having to resolve questions of the intent of the parties during settle-
ment,1 38 whether the fee request came as a surprise to the defen-
dant,1 3" or whether there are other circumstances which would
render the award of a fee unjust.188 As noted earlier, these issues are
not easy to resolve.
An attorney might also attempt to ensure judicial involvement
in the fee award by requesting an interim award of fees, which is
available under section 1988.186 Interim fee awards are normally not
the subject of negotiation. They are available if a plaintiff has pre-
vailed, for example, on one but not all of the causes of action. Al-
though it is not entirely clear when a court has authority to make an
interim fee award, 87 an attorney may attempt to structure litigation
so as to present appropriate circumstances for interim awards. It is
possible that interim fee awards would render a later fee claim so
132. See supra notes 110, 115, and 119-20 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 119-20, and accompanying text.
135. Id.
136. See SUBCOMMITrE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, 216.
137. In Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), the Supreme Court determined
that a party requesting an interim award must establish some liability and that successful
pursuit of discovery would not suffice. Hanrahan is the only Supreme Court guidance on the
issue. In 1981, the Court denied certiorari in Alioto v. Williams, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981) (a plaintiff had received an interim award for prevailing on
a motion for a preliminary injunction; the case became moot), and in Weber v. Barrett, 615
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1022 (1981) (the plaintiffs received an in-
terim award of fees by defeating a motion to intervene). See generally E. LARSON, supra note
4 at 241-42, 244-49.
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minimal that it would create no significant conflict of interest for the
attorney during subsequent negotiations. It is even more possible
that defendants, unaware of the availability of interim fees or unsure
of the circumstances under which a court will award them, will
forego opportunities to negotiate their amount. In Benitez v. Col-
Iazo,13 8 for example, the plaintiff secured a partial consent agree-
ment providing most of the relief which had been requested in the
complaint. 3 9 The agreement did not mention the issue of attorney's
fees. The plaintiffs then successfully petitioned for an interim award
of fees, which was substantial.140 In Benitez, the plaintiff's strategem
for securing a judicial fee award raised the difficult question of fee
waiver, because the partial consent agreement had not mentioned the
fee issue. Interim fee applications which might be presented in other
circumstances would not require resolution of this issue. The
strategem would be undesirable, nonetheless, because it might result
in artificially structured settlement negotiations or litigation strate-
gies and repeated and time-consuming requests for interim awards.
Another attorney strategem is designed to circumvent adverse
consequences to the attorney's fee interest when it does become sub-
ject to negotiation. Assume, for example, that a plaintiff's attorney
has been forced to confront the fee issue by a defendant who insists
on either a waiver or a substantial reduction of fees as a condition of
settlement. The attorney decides that the best way ethically to cope
with the demand is temporarily to accede to the defendant's de-
mands in order to secure a settlement for a client. The attorney then
approaches a court with either a motion to set aside the judgment'
4 '
or with a new complaint for damages in which section 1988 is used
as the basis for a new cause of action. The plaintiffs attorney
would argue that the defendant's settlement demand was impermis-
sible, given the ethical dilemma which it created for the attorney and
the purposes of section 1988, and that the attorney should thus re-
ceive a fee award. This strategem, like the others, generates unneces-
138. 571 F. Supp. 246 (D.P.R. 1983).
139. Only right to treatment issues remained to be litigated. Id. at 248.
140. The total award amounted to $110,530.01. Id. at 254.
141. Levin, supra note 26, at 521. As Levin notes, there is a possibility that a "selective
Rule 60(b) [FED. R. Civ. P.] motion" cannot be made. Rule 60(b) may not permit a court to
set aside those parts of a judgment it does not like while preserving the remainder of the
judgment. In the settlement context, in which the entire agreement may have been esential to
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sary litigation and appeals and tempts attorneys to structure artifi-
cial litigation strategies. It undesirably consumes judicial time and
resources.
IV. NON-NEGOTIABILITY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
In order adequately to insulate both the fact and the amount of
an attorney's fee award from pressures which tempt an attorney to
ignore the client's best interests, courts should consider prohibiting
the attorney's fee from being included as a negotiable item during
settlement discussions. Once a request for attorney's fees is made
under section 1988, the court with jurisdition of the civil rights claim
should assert its authority to decide whether a fee should be
awarded 143 and, if so, in what amount.
Courts may treat fee awards as non-negotiable either if section
1988 is construed to make those awards non-negotiable or if courts
themselves have the authority to require non-negotiability as a mat-
ter of judicial discretion. The possibility that section 1988 will be
construed to require non-negotiability is not great, but the advan-
tages of non-negotiability are such that courts should consider utiliz-
ing their discretion to prevent negotiation of fees.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of Non-negotiability
The advantages of fee non-negotiability are few but important.
The first advantage is simply practical. If attorney's fees were always
to be determined by a court, defendants could not structure a settle-
143. It is important that non-negotiable fee awards not be confused with mandatory fee
awards. Although the latter are usually non-negotiable, the former are not necessarily
mandatory. The language of the two kinds of statutes differs markedly: mandatory fee statutes
stipulate that a prevailng plaintiff "shall recover. . . a reasonable attorney's fee", see, e.g., the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914); discretionary fee statutes provide that "the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee..."; 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1976). The purpose of a mandatory award is usually to preserve the damage award from
reduction in payment of attorney's fees, Twin City Sportservice v. Charles 0. Finley & Co.,
676 F.2d 1291, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), and while the amount of the award is within the discre-
tion of the trial court, the fact of the award itself is not within the discretion of the parties or
the trial court. Id.; Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976). The mandatory provision of the Clayton Act has been construed
narrowly, and applies only to actions in which the plaintiff has been awarded treble damages,
Bryan Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Products Co., 374 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1967). By
contrast, § 1988 and similar statutes vest the trial court with discretion over both the fact and
the amount of an attorney's fee award, David v. Travisono, 621 F.2d 464 (Ist Cir. 1980). The
difference between the two types of awards was considered by Congress during its delibera-
tions concerning § 1988. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 213-14.




ment offer and exploit ethical dilemmas so as to gain a bargaining
advantage over plaintiffs' attorneys. Plaintiffs' attorneys could not be
forced to choose between protecting their own fee interests or pro-
tecting the interests of their clients. They could not be bought off,
and the appearance of impropriety would also be avoided. They
would receive whatever a court determined was due as a fee. The
inherent conflict of interest which exists between attorney and client
cannot, of course, be completely avoided through fee non-negotiabil-
ity. As long as the attorney has a fee interest in the outcome of the
litigation, there will be some conflict. Non-negotiability, however,
greatly reduces the possibility that a defendant will be able to play
on that conflict to the disadvantage of the plaintiff.
14 4
Although the practical effect of eliminating attorney-client con-
flicts of interest is in and of itself worthwhile, the concept of non-
negotiability is equally important because it furthers congressional
objectives which led to the adoption of section 1988. First, it may
encourage an early settlement in those cases which especially inter-
ested Congress when it adopted section 1988. Congress provided for
attorney's fee awards through section 1988 to encourage defendants
to comply voluntarily with the obligations imposed under certain
civil rights statutes. 14 5 When there is a relatively clear violation of
civil rights laws, and a plaintiff has a good chance of winning a law-
suit, the presence of a non-negotiable attorney's fee will encourage
voluntary compliance through early settlement. When the plaintiff
has a strong case, defendants know that they will probably have to
provide most of the relief requested, either through settlement or af-
ter a trial. The attorney's fee award is the only real variable in the
case which can affect the ultimate extent of liability. A defendant,
knowing that a court is certain to award attorney's fees if the plain-
tiff prevails at trial, has an interest in cutting anticipated losses
under section 1988 through settlement. If the fee is non-negotiable
at the time of settlement, defendants will try to minimize the
amount of the award by settling as quickly as possible. 4" If the fee
144. For example, the conflict described at notes 43-48,supra, is one which exists even if
fees are non-negotiable. The conflicts are substantially reduced, however. Although a defen-
dant who can calculate the likely amount of a fee award may try to build a cushion into the
settlement of the merits, see the discussion at supra notes 110-12, regarding the Prandini
procedure, the plaintiff's attorney whose fee is assessed under Hensley, has no incentive to
agree to this cushion as she might were the fee to be subject to negotiation.
145. See supra notes 5 and 9 and accompanying text.
146. It is assumed that the defendant will assess and respond reasonably to the economic
consequences of the fee award. If the defendant has unlimited resources or is committed to
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is negotiable, however, defendants may drag out the litigation be-
cause they know that whenever they decide to initiate a settlement
negotiation, they can attempt to secure a waiver or a substantial re-
duction of fees during negotiation. Non-negotiability may also en-
courage plaintiffs to settle,147 but its primary value is that it encour-
ages defendants' voluntary compliance through early settlement, a
goal which is consistent with the objectives of section 1988.
Non-negotiability is also consistent with several other purposes
of section 1988. Congress intended to provide for fees adequate to
attract competent counsel to civil rights litigation, 14 8 to deter civil
rights violations and to secure voluntary compliance with civil rights
laws,"' 9 and to ensure that the implementation of section 1988 would
not encourage unethical conduct.1 50 Fee non-negotiability achieves
these objectives by ensuring that attorney's fees will be awarded un-
less circumstances reveal that an award would be unjust. A defen-
dant cannot play on the ethical obligations of the plaintiff's attorney
by demanding a waiver or a substantial reduction of a fee request as
a condition to settlement and thereby routinely avoid the assessment
of fees in section 1988 cases. Non-negotiability also mitigates the
severity of ethical problems generated by section 1988, a problem of
which Congress was not unaware. For example, the provision for ju-
dicial discretion in the assessment of fees was designed in part as a
check on attorneys who might otherwise engage in harassing or mali-
cious litigation.' 5' Although the precise ethical difficulty which is the
subject of this article was not debated by Congress, 5 ' one senator
did introduce into the legislative record a law review article on fee
awards in antitrust litigation5 2 which referred to conflicts of interest
litigation as a matter of principle, the defendant may not be encouraged to settle early or at
all, even if the fee is non-negotiable.
147. If a plaintiff has a strong case and a defendant makes an early settlement offer, the
plaintiff will be encouraged to respond to that offer in good faith if § 1988 is construed to
require reduction of a fee award anytime a trial or later settlement negotiation secures only
relief which could have been obtained through an earlier settlement offer rejected by the plain-
tiff. See supra notes 43-48, and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 5-8, and accompanying text, and SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 12.
149. See supra note 9, and accompanying text.
150. See generally the concerns expressed in the debate, SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 27, 63, 67-68, 167, and 180.
151. Id. at 268-69.
152. Id. at 27, 63, 67-68, 167 (discussion of the incentive given to attorneys to stir up
litigation); and at 180 (question whether a judge would be tempted to render a favorable
decision on the merits so as to ensure that a particular attorney would get a fee award).
153. Id. at 151 (introducing Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Anti-
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during settlement and which proposed that courts always retain con-
trol of fee awards.15
Additionally, if fees were non-negotiable, plaintiffs' attorneys
would not need to resort to undesirable legal strategems designed to
achieve the effects of non-negotiability. It is not unrealistic to expect
attorneys to resort in the future to these strategems, for attorneys
have manifested a willingness to use them in the past."" The
strategems are, however, undesirable because they tend to consume
judicial time and resources which would not be expended were the
concept of fee non-negotiability adopted.
There are, of course, also potential disadvantages of fee non-
negotiability. One potential difficulty is that required judicial in-
volvement in fee issues at the time of settlement may arguably ne-
cessitate expenditure of additional and inordinate amounts of judi-
cial resources. It cannot be denied that, if the concept of fee non-
negotiability is adopted, courts will have to devote time to fee re-
quests which otherwise would not have been presented to the court.
Whether, on balance, the time spent will result in an actual in-
creased demand on judicial resources is, however, questionable.
The time which will be required of courts to set fee awards
under recent Supreme Court guidelines is not necessarily substantial.
The amount of a fee award has not been treated as a jury ques-
tion." Both Hensley and the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Blum v. Stenson'57 establish that the fee is determined primarily by
multiplying the number of hours expended in representing the client
by a reasonable rate. Attorneys who expect to receive a full fee must
keep detailed time records. 58 In one jurisdiction, the reasonableness
of the claimed hours is tested by measuring the claim against the
annual norm of attorney billable hours,"" by asking whether the
hours claimed are for tasks normally billed to clients, 16 by assessing
the complexity of the case,"' and by looking for claims for dupli-
trust Litigation, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1656 (1972)).
154. Id. at 160 (Note, at 1678).
155. See supra notes 132-42, and accompanying text.
156. Green, supra note 57 at 237-88.
157. 52 U.S.L.W. 4377 (U.S. S. Ct. Mar. 21, 1984).
158. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933, 1941 n.12, 1942 n.13 (1983) (if
reasonable time records are not kept, a reduced fee is appropriate); Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725
F.2d 127, 130-31 (1st Cir. 1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983); and Beni-
tez v. Collazo, 571 F. Supp. 246, 252 (D.P.R. 1983).
159. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1983).
160. Id. at 554.
161. Id.
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cated services or for the attendance of unnecessary numbers of attor-
neys at hearings.162 The court will determine if there are hours
which are not compensable because entirely unrelated to litigation of
the claim which supports a section 1988 fee by looking at the time
records. 163 Although a hearing may be held on the issue, most of
these inquiries can be resolved through a review of documents,
briefs, and with reference to the court's own observations.
1 64
In order to establish an hourly rate, the plaintiff must produce
"satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation."'6" Testi-
mony as well as the attorney's own affidavits may be required to
establish the rate but, ordinarily, that testimony should be limited.'66
According to the Supreme Court, a "rate determined in this way is
normally deemed to be reasonable .... ,,167
In Blum, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the basic
rate-times-hours fee should be adjusted upwards because of the nov-
elty and complexity of the issues, the exceptional quality of represen-
tation, the nature of the benefits achieved for the plaintiffs, or the
contingent nature of the claim. The Court determined that the num-
ber of attorney hours expended would normally reflect the novelty
and complexity of the issues in a case;' 68 that the quality of repre-
sentation would normally be reflected in the hourly rate; " that ben-
efits achieved are usually taken into account only when a court as-
sesses the results obtained and their relationship to the claimed
hours; 70 and that the record did not support an upward adjustment
for a contingency factor.' 7 ' Thus, the Blum decision removes from
162. Id. In Benitez v. Collazo, 571 F. Supp. 246, 251-52 (D.P.R. 1983), the court notes
that an adjustment is often made by a percentage reduction and not by a time-consuming,
item-by-item examination of records.
163. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 556.
164. In Blum, the Court found that the defendants had waived an evidentiary hearing
and approved the district court's use of affidavits and time records to resolve the fee issue.
Blum, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4378 n. 5.
165. Id. at 4379 n.ll.
166. Id.; Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1984) (court may bring to
bear its own knowledge of local rates).
167. Blum, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4379 n.ll.
168. Id. at 4381.
169. Id. at 4380.
170. Id. at 4381.
171. Id. The Court reserved the issue of whether a contingency factor should ever be
utilized in calculating a fee award. Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney's Fee
Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981) argues against a contingency factor because it puts the
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judicial consideration most subjective factors which might result in
an adjustment of the basic award and which might require more ex-
tended deliberation. The product of rate times hours, which can be
determined largely with reference to time records and affidavits, "is
presumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by 1988.'m
In addition, appeals taken from judicially determined fee
awards are not likely to consume more judicial resources than subse-
quent litigation associated with settlement agreements. Although
consent judgments are generally enforced without modification,173
they may be subject to either direct or collateral attack if it is al-
leged that the settlement was a product of unethical attorney con-
duct.17 4 Proposed settlements may be challenged in class actions by
members of the class who believe that their own interests have been
compromised by the named plaintiff and attorney.175 In addition, be-
cause it is not entirely clear under what circumstances a party will
be deemed to have waived a claim to attorney's fees during settle-
ment negotiations, numerous appeals can be expected on this is-
sue.' 7 Thus, current settlement practices already generate numerous
appeals related to the ethical propriety and intent of settlement dis-
cussions. 177 If appellate courts adhere to the principle that judicially
fee determined awards should be overturned only if there is no evi-
dence in the record to support the exercise of the trial court's discre-
tion, ' 7 any time spent by courts in setting non-negotiable fees would
be largely offset by the time saved because courts did not have to
litigate the ethical or other questions which the negotiable fee inevi-
tably generates. Moreover, even if some additional judicial time is
expended, that time is not inordinate if it preserves the appearance
and fact of ethical conduct, as well as the purposes of section 1988.
attorney in the position of arguing that the case was not strong on the merits, to the possible
disadvantage of the client, or of disclosing confidential information. Id. at 482-84.
172. Blum, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4380.
173. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); Rajender v. Univ. of Minne-
sota, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 607 (8th Cir. 1984).
174. Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument for Compromise and Settlement,
72 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1324-34 (1959).
175. FED R. Civ. P. 23(e).
176. E.g., Benitez v. Collazo, 571 F. Supp. 246 (D.P.R. 1983); and the discussion at
notes 115-18, supra.
177. E.g., Lisa F. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983); and the cases cited in
note 101, supra, and accompanying text.
178. Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir. 1979) (§ 1988); Lindy Bros. Builders
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976). See
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983) (Brennan, J.), in which the majority of the
Court is criticized for being too rigorous in its scrutiny of a fee award. Id. at 1948-51.
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A second possible difficulty with non-negotiable fee awards is
that, unless judicial standards for awarding fees subsequent to settle-
ment are clearly defined, defendants may not wish to settle the mer-
its of a case because they will be unable to estimate their total liabil-
ity. Two related issues must be resolved if defendants are to be able
to estimate their liability with some degree of accuracy. The Su-
preme Court must provide certain standards both for determining
when a party prevails through settlement and for calculating what is
a reasonable fee award when a settlement achieves relief different
from that requested in the complaint or from what a court might
have granted had the case gone to trial.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff may
qualify as a prevailing party under section 1988 by securing relief
through settlement," 9 the Court has not determined whether all re-
lief secured through settlement satisfies the prevailing party require-
ment or whether the relief must have some basis in law. Some courts
require only that the consent agreement be causally related to the
lawsuit.' 80 Others insist that, additionally, the consent agreement
have a legal basis.181
Two years ago, in denying a petition for a writ of certiorari in
Long v. Bonnes,'" the Supreme Court rejected an opportunity to re-
solve the question, although it is of no little import. When a fee is
awarded subsequent to adjudication of the merits of a case, the relief
secured by the plaintiff is, by definition, rooted in the substantive law
applicable to the case. In contrast, a settlement agreement fre-
quently incorporates relief which, although beneficial to the plaintiff,
is not necessarily required by law. "
Justice Rehnquist has argued that, because section 1988 fees
should be awarded to encourage the enforcement of civil rights laws,
"unless an action brought by a private litigant contains some basis in
law for the benefits ultimately received by that litigant,"'8 " a litigant
should not qualify as a prevailing party under section 1988.185 Be-
179. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
180. See, e.g., Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 131 (10th Cir.
1980); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979); Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78
(7th Cir. 1979); and Ross v. Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
181. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978).
182. 651 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 961 (1982).
183. See, e.g., the terms of the consent agreement in Ross v. Saltmarsh, 500 F. Supp.
935, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).




cause Justice Rehnquist's suggested prevailing party standard would
not require judicial inquiry into the merits of a legal claim which has
already been settled, 18' an inquiry which would defeat the purposes
of settlement, 187 it may be a useful and appropriate way to deter-
mine whether a party has prevailed through a settlement agreement.
Until the Supreme Court addresses the question, however, there will
be some uncertainty regarding the effect of a settlement agreement
on liability for fee awards and that uncertainty may affect the will-
ingness of the parties to settle.188
The Supreme Court must also set forth guidelines for determin-
ing the amount of a reasonable fee if litigants are to be given the
degree of certainty as to fee liability which is a prerequisite to settle-
ment of the merits. Although Hensley v. Eckerhart"8 sets forth
guidelines for judicial use subsequent to adjudication of the merits of
a case, those guidelines are not necessarily appropriate for calculat-
ing the amount of a reasonable fee subsequent to settlement.
Hensley requires a court to adjust the base, rate-times-hours fee
whenever the plaintiff prevails on some but not all claims.190 If the
plaintiff achieves "excellent results," 11  no adjustment is to be made
186. Id. at 966 n.3. In Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), the court adopted
a similar approach to an analogous issue. In Gagne, the plaintiff had filed a complaint based
on both a constitutional claim which, if successful, would have supported a § 1988 fee award
and a statutory claim which, arguably, would not have supported an award. The plaintiff se-
cured a settlement based on the statutory claim. The court held that a § 1988 fee award was
appropriate, even if the settlement did not incorporate relief based on the constitutional claim,
if the constitutional claim met the jurisdictional test of "substantiality" set forth in Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). Gagne, 594 F.2d at 340.
187. Gagne, 594 F.2d at 340. See Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir. 1979)
and Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336. 340 (2d Cir. 1979), affd on other grounds, Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), for judicial assertions that courts should not engage in such an
inquiry, especially when the merits involve a constitutional question which courts have tradi-
tionally avoided addressing unless necessary.
188. On the prevailing party issue, see generally Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the
Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 277, 286-94 (1982), and the authorities cited therein.
Prior judicial decisions have taken the position that a fee should not be denied simply
because in the process of negotiating a settlement agreement the plaintiff relinquished some
claims. Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980); Dawson v.
Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); and Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979).
Settlement agreements presuppose compromise and, because it is clear from legislative history
that Congress intended § 1988 to apply to settlement agreements, a denial of fees because the
plaintiff compromised some claims would undercut the purposes of § 1988. Bonnes v. Long,
599 F.2d at 1318. A similar argument might be made that there should be no automatic
reduction of fee awards simply because a settlement agreement incorporates relief which is not
legally required.
189. 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
190. Id. at 1940.
191. Id.
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even if some alternative ground for relief has been rejected 02 or in-
junctive rather than monetary relief is secured. 193 If the plaintiff
achieves only "partial success," however, a court must adjust the
base fee award to account for the "degree of success."" 4 The base
fee may be excessive if the plaintiff's success is only partial even if
the plaintiff's claims were "interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in
good faith.""95 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Hensley that
the possible range of a plaintiff's success is great and did not set
forth precise guidelines for determining the appropriate adjust-
ment.' It left that adjustment to the discretion of the trial court,"
19
which was instructed to "focus on the significance of the overall re-
lief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably ex-
pended on the litigation.'""98
Application of the Hensley guidelines to fee awards subsequent
to settlement is problematic. A settlement agreement may incorpo-
rate compromises which are not necessarily tied to the merits of a
plaintiff's claim and complicate any evaluation of the degree of the
plaintiff's success. In Illinois Welfare Rights Org. v. Miller, 99 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit attempted to perform the
calculation required by Hensley. It stated that any relief which be-
comes part of a settlement agreement because of events entirely in-
dependent of the litigation should be excluded when the degree of
the plaintiff's success is evaluated.200 Once that relief is excluded,
the degree of success is to be calculated by comparing the relief se-
cured with the relief sought in the complaint.2 0' The court concluded
that when application of Hensley to a settlement becomes difficult,
courts should simply adopt Hensley's "central teaching"202, as the ul-
timate guideline for calculating a fee award: the reasonableness of
the proposed fee should be assessed in light of the plaintiff's overall
success.208
Obviously, if fee awards based on settlement agreements must
192. Id. at n.1l.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1940.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1941.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1940.
199. 723 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1983).






be calculated under a degree of success standard derived from Hens-
ley, settlements may be discouraged because defendants will be una-
ble to estimate with any reasonable degree of certainty their total
liability. It is not clear, however, why the Hensley degree of success
standard should be utilized in the calculation of fee awards subse-
quent to settlement. The Supreme Court adopted the Hensley ad-
justment to the base, rate-times-hours fee for a specific reason which
is not relevant to settlements.
When the degree of success was first posited by courts as a fac-
tor relevant to the determination of a reasonable fee award, it was
simply one of twelve factors which were to be weighed together in
calculating fee awards.2 ° It was not a factor which was to be used to
adjust a rate-times-hours calculation, a calculation which was pre-
sumed to state the amount of a reasonable fee. The twelve-factor
balancing process produced widely varying fee awards.20 5 In an at-
tempt to achieve some uniformity in fee awards, therefore, some
courts proposed basing fees primarily on the product of the hours
expended and a reasonable attorney fee rate.20 That base, or "lode-
star", fee might be adjusted, if appropriate, but the fee was to be
primarily dependent on those two factors, the rate charged and the
time expended.
In Hensley, the Supreme Court effectively adopted the "lode-
star" approach to fee calculations. Its more recent decision in Blum
v. Stenson 07 affirmed that approach. Together, the Hensley and
Blum opinions reveal that the degree of success adjustment is used
for a very specific purpose. The adjustment is not intended to pro-
duce an accurate measurement of an appropriate fee award. Indeed,
the degree of success adjustment is not equally applicable to both
potential enhancements and to downward adjustments, 208 as one
would expect it to be were it intended simply as a guideline for fine-
204. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)
(court should look at the results obtained in calculating a reasonable fee in a Title VII case).
Although Johnson was a Title VII case, it was cited with approval in the legislative history of
1988. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4 at 6.
205. See Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
277, 337-41 (1982).
206. Id. at 341-48.
207. 52 U.S.L.W. 4377 (U.S. S. Ct. Mar. 21, 1984). See supra notes 157-72 and ac-
companying text.
208. In Blum, the Court was asked to approve enhancement of a fee award to reflect the
results obtained. It refused to do so. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. In Hensley,
however, it approved a downward adjustment of fee awards if plaintiffs were only partially
successful. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
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tuning the lodestar fee calculation. Rather, the degree of success ad-
justment is required as a means of ensuring that plaintiffs' attorneys
exercise the same judgment regarding the efficacy of pursuing litiga-
tion which they would exercise were they constrained by the need to
satisfy a client that the hours expended in litigation were reasonable.
All of the opinions of the Justices in Hensley manifest this con-
cern. The majority opinion speaks of a need to ensure that plaintiff's
counsel will utilize "billing judgment" even when the defendant
rather than the plaintiff will be responsible for fees.2 09 Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion emphasizes the need for making plain-
tiffs' attorneys accountable to a neutral judge for the choices made
in pursuing litigation. 10 Justice Brennan's concurring and dissenting
opinion approves of the degree of success adjustment because it oper-
ates as a check on insubstantial litigation,21 potentially pursued be-
cause the defendant will be responsible for fees. The Hensley degree
of success adjustment is a manifestation of the Supreme Court's con-
cern that attorneys not be given license to exploit the section 1988
fee statute to acquire windfalls in contravention of Congress'
intent. 2
The concern which prompted the Court to adopt the degree of
success adjustment for fee awards in cases which have proceeded to
trial is not a realistic concern when the parties have agreed to settle
the merits. If a plaintiff agrees to settle, there is strong evidence that
the plaintiff is not dragging out the litigation in pursuit of frivolous
or insubstantial claims so as to pad the attorney's income. A settle-
ment agreement suggests that the plaintiff has been willing to com-
promise when a compromise is appropriate. Hensley itself offers
some assurance that a plaintiff will not proceed to trial with insub-
stantial claims which are unlikely to produce significant relief.
Second, a defendant does have some ability to control fee liabil-
ity by offering reasonable settlements at appropriate times. If either
Rule 68 or Hensley is interpreted so as to require reduction of fee
awards whenever plaintiffs reject settlement offers and subsequently
receive relief no more favorable than that which was offered in set-
tlement, defendants are not at the mercy of plaintiffs' attorneys who
drag out litigation simply to pad income.21 3
209. 103 U.S. S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (1983).
210. Id. at 1943.
211. Id. at 1947.
212. See supra note 70.
213. See supra notes 36-49, and accompanying text. Nuisance suits brought simply to
harass a defendant into settlement might also be dealt with by a determination that a plaintiff
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Given the fact that Hensley gives plaintiffs' attorneys an incen-
tive not to pursue insubstantial claims to trial, that defendants have
some ability to exert control over fee liability through offers of settle-
ment, and that a settlement agreement is itself evidence that a plain-
tiff has been willing to compromise when appropriate rather than
pursuing an arguably insubstantial claim to trial, there is no reason
for the Supreme Court to require adjustment of the lodestar fee cal-
culation for degree of success when the parties have settled the case.
The hours reasonably expended in reaching settlement should be ac-
cepted as the basis for a fee award. Those hours could be easily de-
termined by defendants prior to settlement of the merits through dis-
covery. Defendants could thus arrive at a reasonably accurate
estimate of fee liability, and fee non-negotiability would not discour-
age settlement of the merits." 4
Finally, it may be argued that the concept of fee non-negotiabil-
ity is insufficiently flexible because it does not accommodate the at-
torney who decides that a better settlement for the client can be se-
cured if the claim for fees is relinquished and who wishes to
relinquish that claim in the client's interest. The argument is not
persuasive. It rests on an invalid assumption that the attorney's deci-
sion to relinquish the fee award is made voluntarily and posits flex-
ibility as desirable without regard to the uses to which flexibility is
put.
In many instances in which an attorney decides to relinquish a
fee claim to secure a better settlement for the client, the defendant
will have insisted that the fee request be waived or substantially re-
duced as a condition to settlement.2 1 If the plaintiff's attorney has
the flexibility to accede to the defendant's demand, the client will
benefit, but the client will do so at the expense of the goals which
Congress sought to achieve when it adopted section 1988.216 The
flexibility which enables defendants to take advantage of an ethical
dilemma so as routinely to avoid an assessment of fees is not a flex-
ibility which is consistent with public policy. The concept of fee non-
negotiability, in contrast, would preclude a defendant from insisting
on the involuntary waiver or reduction of fees.
In only one situation can an attorney's relinquishment of a fee
has not prevailed. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
214. This assumes, of course, that courts do not refuse to apply the proper standards for
arbitrary reasons or because of a bias for or against statutory fee awards.
215. E.g., Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
216. Id. at 725-26.
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request be said to be truly voluntary. In that situation, however, pub-
lic policy also argues against flexibility to relinquish the fee request.
Consider, for example, an attempt to lever a relatively weak claim
on the merits into a favorable settlement by asserting a claim for
fees. 17 The plaintiff's attorney would suffer nothing were the fee
claim relinquished. Although Hensley may help to ensure that a rel-
atively weak claim will not support a substantial fee, 18 if the threat
of a substantial fee award were sufficiently real, the defendant might
enter an otherwise unacceptable settlement on the merits, on the
condition that the fee award be relinquished. There is, however, little
public interest in preserving a flexibility which enables a section
1988 fee request to be used to lever a weak or questionable claim
into a settlement.2 19 As long as the attorney and client have the free-
dom at the outset of litigation to determine whether a fee will be
sought,220 sufficient flexibility is preserved.
2 21
217. Perhaps the attorney is salaried or for some other reason is not dependent on a fee
award for compensation.
218. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
219. The practice, unlike threats of criminal prosecution or malicious litigation, is prob-
ably not unethical. Compare MODEL CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105
(1982). There is, however, little public interest in permitting an attorney to induce a defendant
to settle a claim favorably to the plaintiff by threatening to pursue an essentially independent
attorney's fee claim.
220. It should be noted that implicit in Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir.
1983), is the suggestion that attorneys have an ethical obligation to request § 1988 fee awards
if that request will ensure that clients do not have to pay fees from their own pockets. Id. at
1506. Perhaps, however, an attorney would only be required to advise the plaintiff of the op-
portunity to request a fee and of the potential conflict of interest associated with that opportu-
nity. The plaintiff could then choose the desired method of compensation.
221. One other argument against non-negotiability should be mentioned, although it has
little merit in most situations. If an attorney's fee is always set by the court, it may be argued
that the attorney will be so divorced from the control of the client that the attorney will be
insufficiently predisposed to exercise his professional judgment on behalf of the client. An anal-
ogy may be drawn to the situation in which an attorney's fee is paid not by the client but by a
third party. In that situation, rules of professional ethics acknowledge the likelihood that an
attorney may be tempted to ignore the best wishes of the client. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107, EC 5-21-24 (1979). There is a difference in the situations,
however. When an attorney's fee is paid by a third party, there is a fear that the third party
has an interest in the litigation which will cause her to try to persuade the attorney to re-
present the client in a way which is more consistent with her own interests than with those of
the client. When an attorney's fee is paid by a court, there is no basis for that fear. In fact, the
court is given the responsibility for setting the fee precisely because it is assumed to be neutral
and to have the ability to protect the interests of the client against those of the attorney,
whenever they are likely to come into conflict. Cf. Brown v. General Motors Corporation, 722
F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the court denied standing to a discharged attorney to
litigate a fee claim as an independent request to the court because the court feared that to do
otherwise would put an individual who had little or no loyalty to the client in a position to
interfere with the client's best interests.
NON-NEGOTIABLE FEE AWARDS
B. The legal status of fee non-negotiability.
Regardless of the practical advantages of fee non-negotiability,
those advantages are moot if there is no justification in law for its
use. If section 1988 were construed to require fee non-negotiability,
courts would have to implement that concept. As the following dis-
cussion will indicate, however, the likelihood that section 1988 will
be so interpreted is not great. A judicial recognition of the practical
advantages of fee non-negotiability which will foster imposition of
that concept as a matter of judicial discretion is more likely.
1. Non-negotiability and the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §
1988
Section 1988 does not state in unambiguous terms that attor-
ney's fees should be either negotiable or non-negotiable items during
settlement. It simply provides that courts may, at their discretion,
award fees to prevailing parties.2 Other federal statutes with com-
parable language, including those on which section 1988 was
modeled, have been construed to permit fee negotiability.223 Even
when statutes provide for mandatory fee awards when a party
prevails after trial 224 - a provision usually interpreted to preclude
interference with judicial awards of fees 25 - the issue of fees is
considered to be negotiable prior to trial. 26 Congress did not even
provide for mandatory fee awards after trial in section 1988. It
would be difficult, therefore, to conclude solely from the statutory
language that Congress intended fees to be non-negotiable. Courts
and litigants, of course, have assumed that section 1988 permits fee
negotiability.
Balanced against statutory language, judicial precedent, and at-
torney practice in interpreting section 1988 is the fact that fee non-
negotiability is a concept which is consistent with and would further
the purposes of section 1988. The strongest argument for non-negoti-
ability is rooted in the objectives of section 1988. Non-negotiability
is consistent with and would further the objectives of attracting com-
222. See supra note 1.
223. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 20002-3(b) (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(K) (1964).
224. E.g., the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914); Perishable Agricultural Commodi-
ties Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g (1930).
225. See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles D. Finley & Co., Inc., 676 F.2d 1291
(9th Cir. 1982); Baughman v. CooperJarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1976) cert. denied,
429 U.S. 825 (1976); Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 983 (1968).
226. See supra note 130.
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petent counsel to civil rights litigation,2" deterring civil rights viola-
tions, 28 and securing voluntary compliance with civil rights laws.2' 9
It would further these objectives without encouraging unethical con-
duct which some feared section 1988 would foster. 230
The effects of non-negotiability have been discussed previously,
and provide some justification for interpreting section 1988 to re-
quire non-negotiability. Courts have rendered decisions in section
1988 cases intending to preserve these objectives against conduct of
both plaintiffs and defendants which would otherwise defeat it. In
Lisa F. v. Snider,3 1 for example, a district court refused to permit
the defendant to condition settlement discussions on simultaneous
negotiation and a demand for waiver or reduction of the fee request.
The court in Lisa F. ordered mandatory compliance with the bifur-
cated negotiation procedure outlined in Prandini."' In addition, in
Shadis v. Beal,233 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused
to honor a contract prohibiting a legal services corporation from re-
questing or accepting section 1988 fees in suits brought against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or its employees. The decision was
based on the court's determination to preserve the objectives of sec-
tion 1988.284
Finally, in Cooper v. Singer,'35 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that a contingent fee agreement could not limit
the amount of court-awarded fees under section 1988. Despite an
agreement between the attorney and client providing for lesser com-
pensation, the court of appeals insisted that, in order to further the
objective of general deterrence, the court should award fees in accor-
dance with a calculation based on Hensley v. Eckerhart.' 6 The deci-
sion in Cooper was also strongly influenced by the court's desire to
minimize ethical conflicts between attorney and client. The court of
appeals decided that a contingent fee contract should not be permit-
ted to limit the amount of a section 1988 fee because otherwise:
a lawyer who undertakes an institutional reform case
227. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
231. 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
232. Id. at 726.
233. 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982).
234. Id. at 831.
235. 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983).
236. Id. at 1506-07.
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under a percentage contingent fee arrangement may be in-
clined to direct his primary efforts to proving damages,
rather than advocating effective injunctive relief, because a
small damage award will limit his fee ...
According to Cooper, such a limitation might also encourage a law-
yer to maximize the ceiling on section 1988 fee awards by increasing
his share of the recovery under the contingent fee agreement. The
limitation thus could both exert upward pressure on attorney's fees
and reduce the opportunity for a litigant to receive full compensation
for his civil rights injury.
Section 1988 has been interpreted and implemented so as to en-
sure that section 1988 fee claims are pursued ethically and in fur-
therance of congressional objectives. Nonetheless, one would have to
strain principles of statutory interpretation to conclude that Con-
gress intended to utilize fee non-negotiability to achieve the purposes
of section 1988. Most courts have simply used these factors as a jus-
tification for exercising their judicial discretion to avoid the conflict
of interest inherent in cases supporting a section 1988 fee claim.
2. Judicial discretion to preclude fee negotiability
If courts believe that the concept of fee non-negotiability will
further the congressional objectives of section 1988 and that no seri-
237. Id. at 1503. The court also felt that attorneys might be influenced to choose be-
tween "two potential contingent fee clients whose claims have an equal likelihood of success
.... by selecting the client whose claim has the higher damage award potential" and, thereby,
maximizing their own fees. Id.
In addition, the court held that an attorney has an ethical obligation to reduce the amount
of the fee provided for in a contingent fee contract if that amount was greater than the judicial
fee award under § 1988. Id. at 1506. As Cooper reveals, interpretations of § 1988 which
minimize conflicts of interest can attenuate the relationship between the attorney and client in
fee matters. That effect, which in itself has consequences for the ethical conduct of the attor-
ney, see supra note 221, might be viewed as an undesirable byproduct of non-negotiability.
Other interpretations of § 1988 which also attenuate the relationship between attorney and
client have not been rejected because of this difficulty. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct.
1933 (1983), Chief Justice Burger noted that the Hensley standard was premised on the no-
tion that, even if a client were to agree that hours expended by an attorney on the case (and,
therefore, the requested fee) were reasonable, a neutral judge should have the power indepen-
dently to assess the reasonableness of the hours (and the fee). Id. at 1943. Hensley's rationale
persuaded the court in Cooper to conclude that a contingent fee contract is, in litigation which
supports a § 1988 claim, realistically a nullity. 719 F.2d at 1506-07. In addition, the Supreme
Court's decision in White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982), was
based on a determination that a § 1988 fee claim is sufficiently independent of the merits of a
claim to consider it outside the ambit of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
But see Green, supra note 57, who argues that fee claims and the merits of a lawsuit ought not
to be considered independent matters for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
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ous practical drawbacks to its use exist, they have the power to make
fees non-negotiable items during settlement. Both section 1988 and
the judiciary's traditional authority to maintain the integrity of the
legal profession and judicial institutions are sources of a judicial
right to supervise the amount of attorney compensation23 8 and re-
lated procedures, including settlement negotiations. 9
When courts have exercised their discretion to affect the award
of fees, rarely have they completely deprived defendants of the abil-
ity to control the extent of their liability through settlement. For ex-
ample, if a court permits the parties to negotiate a lump sum settle-
ment which includes damages as well as attorney's fees only if the
precise amount of the fee is left for judicial determination, 40 the
defendants can still control the maximum amount of their liability.
Even if a court requires the parties to utilize a bifurcated Prandini
procedure, defendants still have effective control of the maximum
amount of their liability." 1 Although the bifurcated procedure inter-
feres somewhat with that control because it requires the defendant to
agree to settle the merits before discussing the fee award, defendants
are able to make realistic estimates of likely fee liability under Hens-
ley and those estimates affect decisions made in the course of negoti-
ations on the merits.
Fee non-negotiability intrudes no more substantially on the de-
fendant's control of ultimate liability. Defendants may be unable to
bargain on the issue of fee liability but, assuming that an appropri-
ate formula for judicial calculation of fees is devised for settlement
agreements, they will be able to make a reasonable estimate of what
to expect as a judicial fee award. That estimate, which undoubtedly
will also be made by plaintiff's attorneys, may affect the negotiation
of the merits. It is the defendant's interest in knowing the limits of
liability,242 not necessarily in being able to bargain about items con-
stituting that liability, which is valuable. Fee non-negotiability inter-
feres with that interest no more than the Prandini procedure or other
devices to which courts currently resort to minimize the conflict of
interest.24 3
238. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 105-26 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1982) and note 122, supra.
241. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
242. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 454 (1982).
243. Consider a restrospective judicial review of a settlement agreement and subsequent
adjustment of a fee to which the parties have agreed. That review is, of course, appropriate.
E.g., Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Homes, 721 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1983). See supra notes
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Several federal court decisions have indicated that fee awards
based on a settlement of the merits should be left to judicial control.
Although none of the decisions involved section 1988, they are rele-
vant to section 1988 fee awards. In Norman v. McKee," a court
decided not to approve a proposed settlement agreement which relin-
quished many of the plaintiffs' original claims but included an award
of $250,000 to the plaintiffs' attorneys. 24 The court noted that it
was not "good practice" for a settlement agreement to stipulate that
a fee would be paid directly to the attorneys because that stipulation
might lead to a premature or inadequate settlement of the merits.2 "
The court determined that "[a]ny proposed settlement should be
presented in terms of the gross consideration to . . . [those on whose
behalf the suit was brought] and the matter of attorneys' fees left for
judicial determination and award.
'2 47
Other courts have followed the Norman lead. In Jamison v.
Butcher & Sherrerd,2 " the parties had agreed both to relief for the
plaintiffs and to a $50,000 attorney's fee award. The court insisted
that the agreement should not include a payment for the attorney
and that fees should be left to judicial discretion. 49 In Boyd v. Bech-
tel Corp.,250 an agreement provided for the payment of attorney's
fees in an amount to be determined by the court but with an upper
limit of $120,000. When a member of the plaintiff's class objected to
the agreement, the court responded that it had "made it abundantly
clear that it alone has the authority to determine whether and how
much attorney's fees will be awarded in this case, and that it will not
be bound by any agreements between the parties regarding fees."' 5'
Boyd is especially relevant because it involved a fee award under
Title VII, which served as a model for section 1988.
Although courts following Norman have so far reviewed only
class action settlements, 52 there is no reason courts cannot use their
88-91 and accompanying text.
244. 290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aftd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970).
245. One of the named plaintiffs was an attorney, and expected to share in the fee
award. Id. at 36.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
249. Id. at 484.
250. 485 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
251. Id. at 628.
252. See also Anthony v. Superior Ct. for Los Angeles County, 59 Cal. App. 3d 760,
772 (1976).
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discretion in the future to make fees non-negotiable in other cases.2""
Previous judicial interference with negotiation of fee awards has
been limited only because courts have assumed that negotiability and
settlement of fee issues ought to be encouraged as a matter of public
policy25 4 and not because they have assumed that they had no au-
thority to preclude fee negotiation. These courts have characterized
their task as one which attempts to reconcile the need to encourage
settlements with the obligation to protect plaintiffs from unreasona-
ble payments to lawyers.'55 To put the task in these terms predeter-
mines the outcome of the analysis. If settlement of fees is to be en-
couraged, non-negotiable fees, by definition, are unacceptable.
Courts might more willingly utilize the concept of fee non-nego-
tiability were they to state their task in somewhat different terms:
how to avoid the conflicts of interest inherent in giving an attorney a
statutory fee interest in the case while at the same time ensuring
that the objectives of section 1988 are not undermined. This formu-
lation of the task does not balance the need to avoid conflicts of in-
terest only against the policy of encouraging settlements which arises
from the judiciary's desire to avoid increases in workload. Rather, it
balances that need against a concern for the objectives of section
1988.
Some courts have given proper weight to the objectives of sec-
tion 1988. In Bitsounis v. Sheraton Hartford Corp.,5 6 for example,
the court discussed whether Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be construed to require a plaintiff to pay defense
attorney's fees whenever a rejected settlement offer turned out to be
more advantageous to the plaintiff than the relief ultimately secured
through judgment. The court acknowledged that this interpretation
of Rule 68 "would probably advance the generally desirable end of
253. A court does not have to impose fee non-negotiability in every case. See, e.g., Fol-
som v. Butte County Ass'n of Gov'ts, 32 Cal. 3d 668, 681, 652 P.2d 437, 446, 186 Cal. Rptr.
589, 598 (1982) (Norman procedure cited with approval, but not required).
254. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 52 U.S.L.W. 4377, 4381 n.19 (U.S. S.Ct. Mar. 21,
1984) ("Parties to civil rights ligitation in particular should make a conscientious effort, when
a fee award is made, to resolve any differences. . . .The Court . . .has a responsibility to
encourage agreement."); and White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445
(1982). In White, the petitioner argued that a short filing deadline would interfere with the
settlement of fees. See the briefs filed by the petitioner and amicii NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund and Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. In response, the Court held that
the ten-day deadline of FED. R. Civ. P., 59(e) does not apply to fee requests.
255. See, e.g., Godwin v. Schramm, Nos. 83-5065, 83-5129, 83-5130, slip op. (3d Cir.
Mar. 30, 1984); and Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977).
256. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 898 (D. Conn. 1983).
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promoting settlements, 2 57 but nonetheless rejected it because it
might also "effectively undermine . . .[the] fee-shifting scheme de-
liberately adopted to advance the fundamental and salutary objec-
tives of the civil rights laws. '2 58 The court's accommodation of pro-
cedures governing settlement offers on the merits and statutory fee
awards is notable for its refusal to permit judicial policies of encour-
aging settlements to obscure the statutory objective of section 1988.
If other courts were to include these objectives in their analysis, fee
non-negotiability would emerge as a viable method of coping with
the ethical problem created when attorneys are given a statutory fee
interest in a case.259
As long as attorney's fees are negotiable items during settle-
ment, a conflict of interest will exist between attorney and client
which can be exploited to the detriment of ethical conduct and the
intent of 42 U.S.C. section 1988. For this reason, proposals like the
Prandini procedure, which stop short of precluding fee negotiability,
are unsatisfactory devices for minimizing the conflict. Many of these
proposals actually create as many difficulties as they are intended to
solve.
There are also, of course, difficulties associated with fee non-
negotiability. It eliminates the defendant's opportunity to exploit a
conflict of interest between plaintiff and attorney and it removes
most circumstances which generate a suspicion that a plaintiff's at-
torney has acted unethically in negotiating a settlement, 60 but its
successful use depends on the Supreme Court's willingness to set
forth appropriate and clear guidelines for determining who is a pre-
vailing party and for calculating a reasonable fee subsequent to set-
tlement .28  These difficulties are not, however, insurmountable.
257. Id. The court's discussion is dictum only, for the defendant had not requested an
award of fees.
258. Id.
259. Bitsounis is not the only court which takes into account statutory objectives. See,
e.g., Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983) cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3770 (S. Ct.
April 23, 1984); and Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983). Other courts,
however, frequently appear to give the judicial policy of encouraging settlement a weight at
least equal to if not greater than that given to the statutory objectives of § 1988. See supra
note 255.
260. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
261. Courts will also have to reconcile the concept with the provisions of FED. R. Civ. P.
68, which has been construed by one court to permit defendants to make settlement offers
which include a specified amount in attorney's fees, Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir.
1983) cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3770 (S. Ct. April 23, 1984) (the court rejected an argu-
ment that such Rule 68 offers would create an intolerable conflict of interest). Another court
has rejected the Chesny interpretation of Rule 68 because of the difficulties associated with
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Although it is unlikely that section 1988 will be interpreted to
preclude negotiability, courts themselves have the discretion to make
fees non-negotiable. In appropriate circumstances, they should em-
ploy the concept of fee non-negotiability as an alternative to those
devices currently used, both to minimize the attorney-client conflict
and to further the objectives of section 1988.
lump sum offers covering both plaintiffs' damages and attorneys' fees. Fulps v. City of Spring-
field, Tennessee, 715 F.2d 1088, 1095 (6th Cir. 1983). Most courts, however, have only dis-
cussed the issue of whether a Rule 68 offer which includes a reference to "costs" includes
attorney's fees as part of those costs. E.g., Bitsounis v. Sheraton Hartford Corp., 33 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 898 (D. Conn. 1983); Walters v. Heublein, 485 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Cal. 1979); and
Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978). Only Justice Powell, in his concurring
opinion in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981), has suggested that Rule 68
ought to be construed so as to make fees potentially non-negotiable. He proposes that a Rule
68 offer must include fees as part of the costs in order to be a valid offer, id. at 363-64, but
that the terms of the offer must give the plaintiff the option of having the court determine the
amount of the fee. Id. at 365 n.4. Because Justice Powell preserves the negotiability of fees
subsequent to settlement of the merits, at the plaintiff's option, his interpretation of Rule 68
parallels the Prandini bifurcated settlement procedure and has all of its attendant problems.
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